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ABSTRACT
Kant scholarship has a long, rich history of disagreement and interpretive reservations regarding
the Critique of Pure Reason.  One disagreement is over whether the first Critique contains a
sufficient proof of the doctrine of transcendental idealism.  Another disagreement revolves
around the question of whether Kant’s doctrine of transcendental idealism and its associated
metaphysical/epistemological terms conflict with direct realism – a view that Kant also appears
to be committed to. This thesis evaluates what Henry Allison, in his work entitled: Kant’s
Transcendental Idealism: an Interpretation and Defense (1983), sets forth as the direct proof for
transcendental idealism given in the first Critique.  The inter-theoretical relation between
transcendental idealism and direct realism is also evaluated, and argument is given for
considering the two doctrines as consistent with one another after all.
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1CHAPTER 1
DEFLATING THE APPARENT CONFLICT BETWEEN TRANSCENDENTAL
IDEALISM AND DIRECT REALISM
A) Introduction
The objectives of this thesis are the following: one objective is to provide a consistent
reading of Kant’s transcendental idealism that coheres with direct realism; the other objective is
to interpret and evaluate what Henry Allison, a prominent contemporary Kant scholar, takes as
Kant’s direct argument for transcendental idealism.  Satisfying these objectives will involve an
examination of some of the contemporary Kantian literature on these and surrounding issues.
Notably, use will be made of Arthur Collins’ work entitled: Possible Experience: Understanding
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, which maps out a compelling anti-phenomenal idealist approach
to the Critique of Pure Reason (the Critique).
I believe Allison’s interpretation of the Critique secures the full transcendental idealist
thesis as an inseparable aspect of Kant’s theoretic.  Allison writes:
“…I regard transcendental idealism as ubiquitous and, therefore, inseparable from the positive
achievements of the Critique.  Although not often the topic of explicit discussion, it is always there as an
essential background assumption.” (Allison (2007), 32)
In accordance with Allison, I take the proof of transcendental idealism found in the
Transcendental Aesthetic (TA) of the Critique to be quite compelling, and stronger than is
usually assumed. Furthermore, I argue that the doctrine of transcendental idealism and the
doctrine of direct realism are compatible.
The first part of the project will outline the nature of transcendental idealism, its basic
consistency with direct realism, and why it is a compelling philosophical viewpoint. The second
2part will attempt to provide more detailed grounds for the view that transcendental idealism is
consistent with direct realism. This is a tall order, and it is convenient to set forth at the very
outset that to which we will refer throughout much of our investigation, viz direct realism.
B)  “Direct Realism”
I) The Precepts of Direct Realism
The philosophical standpoint known as direct realism accords with that which has come
to be known as naïve realism, i.e., the non-philosophical, common-sense view assumed in
ordinary, everyday experience. In particular, naïve realism is the view that physical, mind-
independent objects are, in ordinary perception, perceived directly.  This is reflected in ordinary
language.  When the tennis player returns a serve, he, if asked, would say that what he saw was
the ball (a physical, non-mental entity), not a mental representation of the ball.  When the tennis
player, in search of the ball after hitting it into a neighbouring shrub, says upon reaching into the
shrub that he feels the ball, he means that he feels the ball, not a mental representation of the
ball. It is straightforward to think of direct realism as a two-pronged thesis. One precept of direct
realism indicates the epistemic relation of objects to the subject in perception, i.e., the immediacy
condition, and this corresponds to the word ‘direct’.  The other precept of direct realism indicates
the nature of the objects given within this epistemic relation, i.e., the physical, mind-
independency condition of such objects, and this corresponds to the word ‘realism’. Taken
together, these are the fundamental tenets of direct realism.  The correctness of direct realism
supplies the theoretical legitimation of naïve realism.
A contrasting standpoint to direct realism is representationalism.  Representationalism,
traditionally conceived, is the philosophical view that the objects of immediate perception are
mental entities.  Such entities have been called intra-mental objects, mental representations, and
3sense-data.  In virtue of such entities being inherently mental, the immediate contents of
perception are not physical, mind-independent entities.
If it is correct that ordinary perceptual experience, i.e., perception of objects under
regular perceptual conditions, consists of directly perceiving mind-independent physical objects,
then the perceptual experience of such objects is epistemologically unproblematic.  An
immediate consciousness of outer objects at the same time constitutes apodictic knowledge of
the existence of such objects. Because there are no epistemic intermediaries (i.e., sense-data) that
stand between the epistemic subject and the external world which would serve to, as it were,
place the subject at one remove from that world so that he is only immediately acquainted with
mental entities, we have non-inferential knowledge of the external world.  Thus, just as
representationalism non-inferentially affirms the existence of sense-data in virtue of sense-data
standing under immediate perception, the existence of physical objects, for the direct realist, is
apodictically affirmed by virtue of their immediacy in perception. However, concerning the
existence of physical objects, the representationalist is confined to the immediacy only of sense-
data; immediate perception does not extend to outer, physical existents.  J.E. Turner sums up this
view in the following: “ ‘The physical thing and the psychic state… are unquestionably two and
mutually independent… The knower is confined to the datum, and can never literally inspect the
existent… We have no power of penetrating the object itself and intuiting it immediately’.  On
the other hand, we can ‘immediately intuit’ the sensation.” (Turner, 126)1 Thus, if knowledge of
physical objects is possible at all under the dispensation of representationalism, it could only be
so via the conjecture that sense-data are representative of physical objects.2  Thus, our
1
 In this passage Turner is citing from the work entitled: Essays in Critical Realism: A Co-operative Study of the
Problem of Knowledge (pp. 240, 203, 225, respectively).
2
 Here I keep in mind that the representationalist may wish to infer from sense-data the mere existence of physical
objects (physical objects qua that which causes sense-data) without assuming that sense-data resemble or ‘connect
4knowledge of physical objects would be a matter of inferring them from sense-data.3
Indeed, seeing a ball, for the representationalist, would have to be qualified in rather
unnatural ways.  The representationalist would have to reformulate the concept of seeing.  For
instance, the tennis player would be said to see the ball in the sense that he perceives mental
representations of the ball.   If the sense-datum theorist did not reformulate the ordinary use of
the concept seeing, then he would either be forced to conclude that the tennis player did not
actually see the ball (the actual non-mental object), or that he did see the ball, but that the ball is
reducible to sense-data.  This consideration points toward a potential reductio ad absurdum
argument against the representationalist view, wherein the representationalist view is reduced to
any one of the following absurd conclusions:  a) seeing physical objects just consists of
apprehending corresponding mental entities, b) we do not see physical objects at all, or c)
‘physical’ objects just are mental objects.
 While it is possible to argue for the validity of both precepts of direct realism separately,
perhaps by first arguing that objects, whatever their nature, are directly perceived, and then
proceeding to prove that such objects are physical objects, a rather ingenious argument for direct
realism, ingenious because it ascertains both conditions of direct realism in a single bound, relies
on arguing that the perception of physical objects holds a position of epistemological primacy.
The epistemological primacy thesis holds that the perceptual knowledge of a physical object is
logically prior to the awareness of an inner, mental entity – Kant’s argument for this is his
Refutation of Idealism (RI), found in the B version of the Critique; the exegesis of which is
with’ their physical causes in any qualitative or numerical respect.  By using ‘representative of’ one leaves open the
possibility of employing either or both senses of inference, one of which does not imply resemblance, but rather, is
taken to merely mean ‘indicative of’.
3
 To know of a correspondence between the mental representation and the outer object unproblematically there
would have to be an epistemic access to the outer objects independent of mental representations in order to check
whether or not the mental representation corresponds to the outer object.  However, this would be a refutation of the
representationalist doctrine, and hence representationalism, traditionally understood, is doomed to result in
problematic idealism (for the definition of problematic idealism, see: footnote 5).
5beyond the scope of this thesis.4  According to problematic idealism, inner things, instead of
outer things, are experienced directly, and indeed, the representationalist affirms that inner
mental things are in fact the immediate objects of perception.5 The representationalist must
maintain we have direct inner experience.  The epistemological primacy thesis uses the
fundamental assumption of the representationalist, i.e. that we have inner experience, against
him: if one concedes that we have inner experience, then one ipso facto concedes that we have
outer experience, given that the experience of outer things holds logically priority over the
experience of inner things.  Such an argument would minimally show that it is not possible for
mental entities to be the sole objects of immediate perception, i.e., it would prove that direct
realism must be true at least once.6  While the mere epistemological primacy of physical objects,
without further considerations at play, provides a sufficient proof that for us there exists an
instance of direct perception of physical objects, provided we grant that we have inner
4
 The epistemological priority of the perception of outer things over the awareness of inner things implies an
ontological dependency in two ways.  First, it does so in the basic sense that inner awareness is ontologically
dependent on outer perception, and, consequently, outer things.  Second, it does so in the sense that, if by an
awareness of inner things one means an awareness of something of which its existence is constituted in its being
perceived (i.e., esse est percipi), then, inner things are ontologically dependent on the perception of outer things,
and, consequently, outer things per se.
5 Problematic idealism is the label Kant gives to one of the two types of material idealism.  According to Kant,
Descartes is a problematic idealist:
“[Problematic idealism is the view]…that declares the existence of objects in space outside us to
be…merely doubtful and indemonstrable… [this is the] idealism of Descartes, who declares only one
empirical assertion (assertio), namely I am, to be indubitable…” (B 274)
The other type of material idealism Kant calls dogmatic idealism.  According to Kant, Berkeley is a dogmatic
idealist:
 “[Dogmatic idealism is the view]…that declares the existence of objects in space outside us to
be…false and impossible… [this is the idealism] of Berkeley, who declares space, together with all the
things to which it is attached as an inseparable condition, to be something that is impossible in itself, and
who therefore also declares things in space to be merely imaginary.” (B 274)
6
 The mere epistemological priority of physical objects only provides the basis for the necessity of one instance of
direct perception of physical objects, i.e., it states that we must be put into immediate perceptual contact with a
physical object (or objects) at least once, and while this itself provides a sufficient refutation of global idealism, it
does not demonstrate that our ordinary perceptual experiences retain the character of direct realism.  This further
claim, i.e., that ordinary (outer-worldly) perceptual experiences, under sufficient subjective and objective perceptual
conditions, are generally a direct acquaintance with physical objects, requires further argument.  Purportedly, Kant’s
RI goes beyond the mere epistemological priority thesis and proves the ongoing epistemological priority of
perceiving physical objects directly.
6experience, it is not a sufficient proof of the broad correctness of direct realism, which affirms
that, for the most part, everyday perceptual experience consists of an immediate consciousness of
physical objects.7 The latter is something that would be required for a theoretical legitimation of
naïve realism.  However, purportedly, epistemological primacy considerations reach a level of
effectiveness in the Kantian doctrine such as to constitute a proof of the broad correctness of
direct realism.
II) Drawing the Lines of Debate
Of these two options, i.e., direct realism or representationalism, representationalism is
extremely problematic, since it affords apodictic certainty only to mental existents and it begets
skepticism concerning the external world.  As Kant more or less straightforwardly puts it,
“Thus I cannot really perceive external things, but only infer their existence from my inner
perception, insofar as I regard this as the effect of which something external is the proximate cause.  But
now the inference from a given effect to its determinate cause is always uncertain, since the effect can have
arisen from more than one cause.  Accordingly in the relation of perception to its cause, it always remains
doubtful whether this cause is internal or external, thus whether all so-called outer perceptions are not a
mere play of our inner sense, or whether they are related to actual external objects as their cause.” (A 368)
Kant calls this problematic idealism. A second possibility, direct realism, is that although sensed-
content is a necessary condition of perceiving external reality, what we immediately apprehend
in perception are non-mental, outer objects; that is, the knowing subject is directly acquainted
with non-mental, outer reality.  There is a controversy in Kant scholarship as to whether Kant
falls in the first category as a sophisticated, or perhaps even inconsistent, sense-datum theorist, or
if he belongs to the second category as a direct realist.  Let us merely note at this point that Kant
7
 Here I leave open the possibility of a more radical skepticism, one which Allison gestures at during his analysis of
RI in subsection III, The Return of the Skeptic (Allison (1983), 304).
7takes himself to refute problematic idealism in RI of the Critique, and this refutation consists in
Kant’s demonstrating our immediate apprehension of outer objects.  If Kant was a sense-datum
theorist, this argument is perplexing to say the least since it reveals the ineliminability of outer
sense, i.e., it demonstrates that we must have immediate contact with non-mental objects, and
that ‘outer sense’ cannot therefore be understood as merely a variant of ‘inner sense’. Thus, RI
seems to compromise any sense-datum or representationalist interpretation of the first Critique.8
If one is to make consistent all essential features of Kant’s doctrine of perception, such features
must be reconciled with RI, since this seems to be such an important passage.  This, along with a
plethora of other considerations, some of which will be addressed, is the raison d’être for
interpreting Kant along direct realist lines.  Let us now begin the exegesis of Kantian doctrine
with an examination of transcendental idealism, an examination that will transition into chapter
two’s detailed analyses of the essential arguments of the Transcendental Aesthetic.
C) Transcendental Idealism, Transcendental Realism, and the Appearance/Thing in Itself
Distinction
As we shall see, Kant believes the grounded existence of spatial and temporal objects,
qua spatial and temporal objects, lies in a nexus that refers to our mode of cognition; this is
opposed to their existence being grounded in themselves. The locution ‘grounded existence’ has
an epistemic and an ontological sense. In the epistemic sense, for something to have a grounded
existence means that the affirmation of that thing’s existence is justified (i.e., ‘grounded’).  In
accordance with transcendental idealism, apart from the mind’s mode of cognition, i.e.,
abstracting from the subjective conditions of experience, we cannot justifiably affirm the
8
 Let us also note that, as for dogmatic idealism, Kant takes himself to refute Berkeley in the Transcendental
Aesthetic of the Critique (B 274; see B 69, 70-1).
8existence of space and time, or spatial and temporal predicates.   In accordance with
transcendental realism, on the other hand, we can justifiably affirm the existence of space and
time, or spatial and temporal predicates, apart from the mind’s mode of cognition.  In the
ontological sense, something’s having a ‘grounded existence’ means that the necessary and
sufficient ontological conditions of that thing are satisfied. The transcendental idealist maintains
that space and time, and spatial and temporal predicates, have no existence grounded in
themselves, i.e., apart from our mode of cognition – i.e., the necessary and sufficient conditions
of their existence are not satisfied.  This is tantamount to the view that the spatial and temporal
organization of objects of experience is ontologically dependent on the mind’s mode of
cognition.  Conversely, the transcendental realist maintains that space and time, or spatial and
temporal predicates, have a grounded existence in themselves – i.e., apart from the mind’s mode
of cognition.  Both of the transcendental idealist’s assertions regarding the ‘grounded existence’
of space and time, and spatial and temporal predicates, are implied by the epistemological
considerations concerning formal conditions of experience which will be considered shortly.
Now, if the transcendental idealist argues that objects of experience are ontologically dependent
on their spatial and temporal organization (a view which falls under what I will term the
ontological non-equivalency thesis, or two-world standpoint (ONET) – i.e., the view that, to
 The case becomes vexed with regard to what are for Kant objects of inner sense, since these objects, accordingly,
adhere to the ontological principle esse est percipi (i.e., to be is to be perceived).  There is reason to believe,
however, that the transcendental distinction of how such objects appear as opposed to how they are in themselves
holds (see: footnote 24).  However, we cannot characterize these objects as they are in themselves as mind-
independent entities, since they are, in the subjective succession of the mind, mind-dependent things in themselves.
However, their objective or determinate temporal predicates are nevertheless not grounded in themselves, but only
insofar as they appear in the objective succession of empirical consciousness in accordance with the law of
causality.  Thus, with regard to inner objects, we must qualify the transcendental ideality of their temporal predicates
to only refer to their objective or determinate temporal predicates, insofar as they have (indeterminate) temporal
predicates in themselves within the subjective succession of the mind.  Furthermore, their independence from the
mind’s mode of cognition qua things in themselves must also be qualified; for they are in themselves dependent on
the mind’s subjective succession, and therefore on the mind’s mode of cognition.  However, they are also, as things
in themselves, independent of the formal parameters of the objective succession of the mind, and hence, independent
of this ‘second layer’, as it were, of the mind’s mode of cognition.  It is this latter respect in which we may say that
the things in themselves of inner sense are independent of the mind’s mode of cognition.
9
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9anticipate our discussion of the appearance/thing in itself distinction, appearances are
ontologically (i.e., numerically) distinct from things in themselves), then not only are the spatial
and temporal features of objects transcendentally ideal, but the spatial and temporal objects are
likewise transcendentally ideal.  On the other hand, if one interprets transcendental idealism as
not containing the view that spatial and temporal objects are ontologically dependent on their
spatial and temporal organization, this does not affect the full transcendental idealist thesis. That
is, even if things in themselves and appearances are not ontologically (i.e., numerically) distinct
– a standpoint which I will term the ontological equivalency thesis (OET) or one-world
standpoint – and objects are extricable from their spatial and temporal organization, and as such
have grounded existence independent of the mind’s mode of cognition, the grounded existence of
the spatial and temporal organization of objects is nevertheless constituted in the object’s status
as appearance; its spatial and temporal features are not attributable to objects qua things in
themselves.10 The OET interpretation of transcendental idealism will be developed in chapter
three, and it will become apparent that this interpretation plays an important role in reconciling
transcendental idealism with direct realism.11
  The fact that the grounded existence of spatial and temporal objects qua spatial and
temporal objects depends on their relation to the mind’s mode of cognition constitutes their
10
 Let us note that the justification for existence claims regarding spatially and temporally organized objects per se
must rely on the brute fact of experience itself. The a priori conditions of experience secure the spatial and temporal
organization of objects of experience; the fact that we have experience affirms the objective reality of spatial and
temporal objects – the transcendental necessity of the objective reality of space and time is predicated on the reality
of experience itself; experience presupposes their objective reality.
11
notices this ‘fashioning’, as it were, in the preceding formulation of grounded existence per TI (see: p. 7) in the
following qualification (shown in italics): ‘the grounded existence of spatial and temporal objects, qua spatial and
temporal objects, lies in a nexus that refers to our mode of cognition’. The OET interpretation of transcendental
idealism requires the qualification ‘qua spatial and temporal objects’, given that, according to this interpretation,
spatially and temporally organized objects are numerically equivalent to things in themselves.  Thus, they have a
grounded existence independently of their relation to the mind’s mode of cognition, just not as spatial and temporal
objects (i.e., where they would retain their spatial and temporal organization), since, according to transcendental
and addressed later on.
 As such, the discussion is fashioned to accord with the OET interpretation of transcendental idealism.  One
idealism, their spatial and temporal organization depends on this relation.  This distinction will be further developed
10
status as appearances and is a direct result of the insistence on a priori formal epistemic
conditions of experience.  That is, if one concedes that there are a priori formal epistemic
conditions of experience one negates the possibility of perceiving things as they are in
themselves.  Furthermore, not only must we describe such conditions as functions of the mind’s
mode of perception, and, in dialectical fashion, the mind’s mode of perception as a function of
such conditions, but it is also the case that the formal features of objects of experience, issuing
from a priori formal epistemic conditions of experience, cannot be taken as things in themselves.
Let us then discuss the notions of appearance and thing in itself that Kant deploys in order that
we may understand how the a priori formal epistemic status of space and time – i.e., how space
and time understood as a priori formal epistemic conditions of sensibility – entails the full
transcendental idealist thesis.
What lies at the heart of the antithetical relation between transcendental realism and
transcendental idealism is the appearance/thing-in-itself distinction.  This distinction has to do
with the transcendental nature of objects experience, that is, with how these objects are
conceived once they are thought in terms of their relation to the mind’s mode of cognition and
their possibility of being cognized. Transcendental idealism takes objects of experience, qua
objects of experience, to be appearances. Objects qua appearances depend on a relation to the
mind’s mode of cognition; this relation constitutes their spatial and temporal organization – i.e.,
their formal features qua objects of experience – whereas for transcendental realism, what for
Kant are formal features of objects of experience, and mutatis mutandis formal structures of
human sensibility (i.e., receptivity) and judgment, are properly taken as things in themselves, and
hence such features do not depend on a relation to the mind’s mode cognition. Transcendental
reflection is thus a supreme epistemic exercise concerning objects of experience and their status
11
as either things as they are in themselves or appearances. Furthermore, as Allison writes,
“…transcendental idealism and transcendental realism are mutually exclusive and exhaustive
metaphilosophical alternatives…” (Allison (1983), 35) Lastly, determining the transcendental
status of objects of experience as either appearances or things as they are in themselves hinges
on the affirmation or denial of a priori formal epistemic conditions of experience, the
affirmation of which entails the rejection of such object’s being things as they are in themselves,
and vise versa.
Now, it is essential to the last point that space and time qua formal conditions are
understood as first and foremost subjective conditions of the intuition of objects, or as conditions
of sensibly intuiting. That they are conditions or forms of sensibly intuiting marks out the
subjective nature of space and time by specifying that they are part of the structure of the mind’s
faculty of representation. To anticipate, we have to rule out that space and time are merely the
conditions or forms of the sensibly intuited, since, under this general description, space and time,
or spatial and temporal features, are perhaps things in themselves, and intuited objects ‘in
themselves’ contain the structural ground of the possibility of their being sensibly intuited.
Taking space and time as mere ‘forms of the sensibly intuited’, in other words, is consistent with
the direct apprehension of transcendentally real space and time.  Space and time may serve as
‘conditions of experience’ in a sense that does not entail their transcendental ideality, then,
insofar as they are the mere forms of the intuited. This possibility is expressed by Allison in the
following passage:
“…[T]here is a contradiction involved in the assumption that the representation of something that
is supposed to function as a condition of the possibility of the experience of objects can have its source in
the experience of these object…[However,] [i]t might seem that there is another, far more reasonable,
12
alternative:  that we have a direct acquaintance with space itself, and that this enables it to serve as a
‘condition’ of experience in the sense that it provides a fixed framework with respect to which we can
orient ourselves and distinguish between the real and apparent (relative and absolute) motion of bodies.”
(Allison (1983), 110)
This objection may be termed the transcendentally real forms of intuition objection.  While a
discussion of the weak form of this objection will transpire in this chapter, I will postpone the
analysis of how this strong formulation of the objection is misconceived until the end of chapter
two, where the analysis will be informed by the detailed exposition of Kant’s conception of the
nature and function of the representation of space.
Regarding the difference between transcendental idealism’s and transcendental realism’s
respective doctrines of grounded existence, Kant states:
“We have sufficiently proved in the Transcendental Aesthetic that everything intuited in space or
in time, hence all objects of an experience possible for us, are nothing but appearances, i.e., mere
representations, which, as they are represented, as extended beings or series of alterations, have outside our
thoughts no existence grounded in itself. 12  This doctrine I call transcendental idealism. The realist, in the
transcendental signification, makes these modifications of our sensibility into things subsisting in
themselves, and hence makes mere representations into things in themselves.” (A 490-91/B 518-19)
Despite its representationalist air, this passage indicates that Kant finds the distinction between
transcendental realism and transcendental idealism to be constituted by the former taking spatial
and temporal objects, qua spatial and temporal objects, to have an existence grounded in
12
 Here Kant is trading on an ambiguity.  The confusion comes from the claim that objects of experience are
“…nothing but appearances, i.e., mere representations…”  Under the OET interpretation, this is certainly not the
case.  Rather, it is true that spatiotemporal objects cease to exist outside their relation to minds, insofar as the
spatiotemporality of such objects ceases to exist outside of this relation; but insofar as the ‘object’ is separable from
its spatial and temporal form (i.e., in accordance with OET), it certainly may well exist outside of this relation.
Spatiotemporal objects, however, in the preceding qualified sense – i.e., spatiotemporal objects qua spatiotemporal
objects, are not grounded in themselves; we may excuse Kant for saying so.  Let us also note that there is a
redeeming point in the passage with regard to the OET interpretation when Kant makes the qualification “…which,
as they are represented, have outside our thoughts no existence grounded in itself [emphasis mine]…”
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themselves – i.e., it conceives them as grounded independently of their relation to the mind’s
mode of cognition – while the latter conceives such objects as only being grounded through their
relation to the mind’s mode of cognition (i.e., as appearances).  Objects qua appearance have
grounded existence through a nexus which refers to the mind’s mode of cognition, that which
grounds the organizational form of the object, as well as to, as we shall see, their source of
material input, i.e., their material ground (i.e., the thing in itself), whereas things in themselves
are grounded in themselves, i.e., without such reference to the mind’s mode of cognition.
 In introducing his Copernican revolution, Kant famously wrote:
“Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects…let us once
try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must
conform to our cognition…” (Critique of Pure Reason, B xvi)
Transcendental realism (TR) is the view that objects of cognition are unconditioned by the
mind’s mode of cognition; rather, the direction of fit is the reverse: the objects of cognition
condition the mind’s mode of cognition. In short, the objects of cognition themselves set forth the
epistemic curriculum with which we must comply in order that we may cognize them.  By the
same token, objects of cognition are (unconditioned) things as they are in themselves – indeed,
they retain the form they have in cognition apart from their relation to the mind’s mode of
 To remark in passing, this reference to the thing in itself (or, given a descriptive title in the transcendental
framework, the transcendental object) is a purely analytic operation that is conceptually necessitated from the nature
of a transcendental account (Allison (1983), 250).  Kant refers to the transcendental object as “…the purely
intelligible cause of appearances in general…” (B 522-23). This goes to the analytic status of the reference to the
transcendental object:
“Kant can be taken to be merely affirming the by now familiar contention that the thought of an
object as such a ground requires the consideration of the object in abstraction from its empirical character,
and thus as it is in itself.  Once again, Kant can say this because it is a merely analytic claim, based upon
the concept of an object that is conceived within a transcendental context as the ground of our
representations.” (Allison (1983), 254)
Such analytic propositions, qua determinations of mere reason, for Kant, do not yield cognition (see: Critique of
Pure reason (Guyer/Wood trans.); pp. 338 – footnote: b.). Thus, the reference to things in themselves, qua mere
conceptual extension of the transcendental framework, does not pretend to any knowledge of such things.
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cognition – they are perceived as they are in themselves.
Transcendental idealism (TI), on the other hand, is the insistence on a priori formal
epistemic conditions of intuition and judgment, and hence takes objects of cognition as
conditioned by an epistemic curriculum set forth by the mind’s mode of cognition.   In
elaboration, Allison writes:
“…[B]ehind Kant’s formal [i.e., transcendental] idealism, lies a principle that is implicit in the
Critique as a whole, but is nowhere made fully explicit:  that whatever is necessary for the representation or
experience of something as an object, that is, whatever is required for the recognition or picking out of
what is ‘objective’ in our experience, must reflect the cognitive structure of the mind (its manner of
representing) rather than the nature of the object as it is in itself.  To claim otherwise is to assume that the
mind can somehow have access to an object (through sensible or intellectual intuition) independently of the
very elements that have been stipulated to be the conditions of the possibility of doing this in the first
place…  The transcendental realist avoids this contradiction only because he rejects the assumption that
there are any such conditions.  In so doing, however, he begs the very question raised by the Critique.”
(Allison (1983), 27)
Thus, according to Allison, the a priori formal epistemic conditions of experience have their
ground in the mind and not in the objects in themselves; otherwise, we run into a contradiction.
 What Allison means by an “epistemic condition” is a non-logical condition of representation (i.e., a condition that
does not merely state requisites for a representation’s conformance with the principle of non-contradiction, or other
“logical conditions of thought”) that is “…necessary for… [a representation to be a]…representation of an object or
an objective state of affairs.  As such, it could also be called an ‘objectivating condition’; for it is in virtue of such
conditions that our representations relate to objects or, as Kant likes to put it, possess ‘objective reality.’ ”  (Allison
(1983), 10)  Epistemic conditions contrast to both “psychological conditions” and “ontological conditions”; the
former are meant to mark out “…some mechanism or aspect of the human cognitive apparatus that is appealed to in
order to provide a genetic account of a belief or an empirical explanation of why we perceive things in a certain
way…”, the latter is meant as a condition “…of the possibility of the being of things…[and] [s]ince the being of
things is here contrasted with their being known, an ontological condition is, by definition, a condition of the
possibility of things as they are in themselves (in the transcendental sense).” (Allison (1983), 11)
 Here, Allison resonates well with Collins:
 “… [Kant] emphasize[s] the subjectivity of empirical objects and, consequently, the impossibility
of forming any conception that sets them apart from the knowledge yielded by our sensible representations.
That is why he says that we have no access to objects as entities corresponding to our empirical knowledge
of them that would enable us to contrast how things appear and how they are.  With this renunciation of a
corresponding entity, Kant excludes access to things as they are in themselves.”  (Collins, 42)
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If space is a formal condition of sensibly intuiting an object, yet is also a thing in itself, and not
rather a formal structure of the mind’s mode of cognition and mutatis mutandis a formal feature
of objects of cognition16, and we intuit space as, for the transcendental realist, we do objects, i.e.,
we intuit a thing in itself, just how this intuition is possible is perplexing.  This is so since space
would be a precondition – i.e., y is a precondition of x if the possibility of x is predicated on y,
and y must be true (or exist) prior to x – of such intuition. In, A Commentary on Kant’s Critick of
the Pure Reason, Kuno Fischer writes:
“It is impossible to deduce space and time from our perceptions, simply because our perceptions
are all only possible through space and time; wherefore these two representations are not and cannot be
deduced.  They are original representations, such as our reason does not receive from without, but has
through itself—which do not follow, but anticipate experience—are not its product, but its condition—are
not a posteriori, but a priori.” (Fischer, 38)
Space, understood as a form of outer sensible intuition, and the representation of space,
understood as an a priori representation, hold a position of logical priority over the empirical
consciousness of things.  This means that the representation of space cannot be ‘empirically
obtained’; nor could space per se be wholly empirical.  These thoughts are reflected in the
following passages:
“The representation of space cannot, therefore, be empirically obtained from the relations of outer
appearance.  On the contrary, this outer experience is itself possible at all only through that
representation….It must therefore be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, and not as
a determination dependent upon them.  It is an a priori representation, which necessarily underlies outer
16 This distinction is clearly articulated by Allison as the distinction between ‘the form of representing’ and ‘the
form of what is represented’; both notions are contained under the locution “form of representation” (Allison (1983),
112).  This distinction parallels the distinction between the ‘form of intuiting’, and the ‘form of the intuited’, both of
which are contained under the locution ‘form of intuition’ (Allison (1983), 97)  I have attempted to indicate the
shifts in these manners of speaking within my discussion.
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appearances.17”  (A23-24/B38-39)
“Since that within which the sensations can alone be ordered and placed in a certain form cannot
itself be in turn sensation, the matter of all appearance is only given to us a posteriori18, but its form must
already lie ready for it in the mind a priori, and can therefore be considered separately from all sensation.”
(A 20)
If intuition is the way by which we have epistemic access to objects, the conditions of having
such intuition must be satisfied before this access is possible. If we are to hold that there are
formal conditions of sensibility at all, the mind must be responsible for them. The fact that
formal conditions originate from the mind is built right into the nature of form – at least insofar
as it is taken to mean the form of sensibly intuiting.
The same may be said of the categories (qua conditions of judgment). It is not possible
that the mind principally acquires or ‘rigs-up’ these concepts through abstracting them from
experience, since they must be already present in the mind in order for experience to be possible.
conditions themselves. Furthermore, we must conceive the formal features of objects of
experience, qua functions of the mind’s mode of cognition, as conditions that only pertain to
appearances, and not, rather, as things in themselves.  These considerations are what Kant has in
mind with regard to temporal predicates, but apply to all formal features of objects, when he
17
 The apriority of the representation of space by itself does not entail the transcendental ideality of space – for one
thing, it has not been ruled out that the representation of space is a concept; as such, the content of the representation
would not be space per se, but rather subordinate concepts.  For another thing, even if one conceives of the
representation of space as an a priori intuition, and hence the content of the representation is space per se (i.e.,
extension), the argument must still be made that this entails that space is a form of sensibility – for this is the only
way the transcendental ideality of space is determined.  Asserting that space is a form of sensibly intuiting is
tantamount to the transcendental ideality of space.
18
 Since, according to Kant, matter is a precondition of experience, it has logical priority over experience and is thus
a priori. Nevertheless, the introduction of matter is predicated on sensory affection.  It is in this sense, a posteriori.
This is not Kant’s conventional sense of experience; rather, experience is taken in the maximally abstract sense of
bare affection.
The alternative requires that it is possible to intuit such objects apart from these necessary
17
writes:
“… [W]e dispute all claim of time to absolute reality, namely where it would attach to things
absolutely as a condition or property even without regard to the form of our sensible intuition. Such
properties, which pertain to things in themselves, can never be given to us through the senses.” (A 35-36/B
52)
According to Allison, the transcendental realist’s assertion that – what for Kant are
things in themselves, forces the transcendental realist to deny that such things are a priori formal
conditions of objects of experience. However, this entailment is not yet explicit.  It must be
made explicit that if we affirm space and time, and spatial and temporal predicates as a priori
formal epistemic conditions of experience, then space and time, and spatial and temporal
realist is to be forced to deny the existence of a priori formal epistemic conditions of experience.
For up to now the possibility is still open for the transcendental realist to concede the
transcendental ideality of the space and time of perception, while at the same time maintaining
that such formal features of perception have transcendentally real equivalents or correlates.
The notorious ‘Neglected Alternative’ objection19 against the transcendental ideality of
the formal features of objects of experience – i.e., against the view that space and time, and
spatial and temporal predicates, qua functions of the mind’s mode of cognition, do not exist
outside of a reference to the mind’s mode of cognition, and are not things in themselves –
concedes that space and time, or spatial and temporal predicates, qua formal features of objects
19 In discussing how to handle this objection, Allison notes that “[o]ne of the standard strategies for dealing with this
objection is to admit that the alternative is left open or neglected by the Transcendental Aesthetic, but to claim that it
is removed by the resolution of the Antinomies.  Such a move is certainly compatible with the interpretation of the
Antinomies [I offer]…” (Allison (1983), 112).  In accordance with Allison, I believe that resorting to this strategy is
unnecessary, given the adequacy of the following considerations which issue from TA for rejecting this objection.
formal features of objects of experience – space and time, or spatial and temporal predicates, are
predicates, ipso facto cannot be things in themselves; this must be proven if the transcendental
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of experience, depend on a relation to the mind’s mode of cognition. However, the neglected
alternative objection asserts that this fact does not remove the possibility that space and time, or
spatial and temporal predicates, indifferently to their role in cognition, may also be things in
themselves.  As we have said, this would mean that the space and time of perception would have
transcendentally real equivalents or correlates, qua things in themselves. Let us now examine
why this objection is misconceived, that is, why things in themselves cannot be equivalent to, or
correlated with, formal features of objects of experience.
To recapitulate, the objection states that one has not proven that the formal features of
objects of experience, that mutatis mutandis are formal structures of the mind’s mode of
cognition, are, quite apart from their functions with regard to perception, not also things in
themselves.  This means that one has not definitively marked out a transcendental idealist
position through the epistemic considerations previously discussed; for things in themselves may
merely be as they appear, albeit perhaps only coincidentally.
To see how this objection is unfounded, let us first look at how Allison sets up the
objection.  Allison writes,
“Although Kant himself infers the transcendental ideality of space directly from his conclusion
that space is a form of human sensibility, it is frequently maintained that this conclusion, even if it be
granted, does not suffice to prove that space is transcendentally ideal, that is, that it does not pertain to
things as they are in themselves.  After all, might it not be the case both that space is such a form and that
things as they are in themselves are spatial or in space?  Indeed how can Kant deny such a possibility
without contradicting his cherished critical principle that things as they are in themselves are unknowable?”
(Allison (1983), 111)
Thus, there appear to be two parts to the present predicament: one part requires us to give a
justification for the completeness of the transcendental idealist picture based on the epistemic
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considerations at play; the second problem requires us to make the complete transcendental
idealist picture cohere with Kant’s critical principle regarding the epistemic status of things in
themselves – for it appears that transcendental idealism commits us to some positive assertion
regarding the nature of things in themselves.20  The first part of this issue will now be addressed.
The ‘neglected alternative’ asserts a correlation between the space and time of perception
with a transcendentally real space and time; i.e., space and time that are things in themselves.21
The possibility that the space and time of perception is numerically identical to space and time
that are things in themselves, i.e., that they are one and the same, is undone by the fact that the
former space and time are dependent on the mind’s mode of cognition (qua formal conditions),
while the latter would, qua things in themselves, be independent of the mind’s mode of
unsurprisingly, is derived from a qualitative distinction:  the space and time of perception have
the quality of being dependent on the mind’s mode of cognition, while space and time that are
things in themselves have the quality of being independent of the mind’s mode of cognition.  So,
there is a sufficient qualitative distinction between the two sets of space/time, and thus whatever
correlation there may be between the two, it cannot be that the two are qualitatively or
numerically identical (i.e., what are qualitatively distinct must be numerically distinct, even
though not visa versa).  However, this leaves the proponents of the neglected alternative with the
less impressive claim that the two sets of space/time hold a relation of similarity.  On this point
Allison writes:
20
 Or rather, transcendental idealism appears to commit us to some negative assertion regarding the nature of things
in themselves, i.e., that they are not spatiotemporal entities.  However, in Hegelian spirit, every negation is an
affirmation.
21
 We cannot here even strictly hypostasize space and time or consider them properties or things; for, given the strict
parameters of Kant’s theoretical or critical agnosticism regarding things in themselves, perhaps they are, for all we
know, made of green cheese…Nevertheless, spatial and temporal properties of things in themselves are, ipso facto,
‘things’ in themselves.
cognition. This shows a numerical distinction.  However, the numerical distinction,
20
“Once again, one would be speaking of a similarity or analogy between something that involves
an essential reference to mind and something that, ex hypothesi, is totally independent of mind.  If such a
notion escapes the charge of being self-contradictory, it is only at the cost of its utter vacuity.22” (Allison
(1983), 113)
Thus, it appears that the transcendental ideality of space and time, and spatial and
temporal predicates, is entailed by the concession that such things are formal features of
experience, since from this understanding, it follows that space and time are absolutely
dependent on the mind’s mode of cognition; if this is a necessary aspect of the nature of our
space and time, then it seems injudicious to call space and time that does not have this property
space and time at all.
The second part of the predicament can be answered straightforwardly from the
preceding analysis.  We have effectively reduced the claim that space and time are things in
themselves to a vacuous, if not contradictory, assertion.  Rendering a proposition vacuous is,
from the critical standpoint, providing a sufficient conceptual refutation of that proposition.
Kant is therefore justified in inferring from the nature of space qua formal property the
transcendental ideality of space.  “To entertain groundless possibilities is no part of the work of
philosophy, and Kant is not to be blamed for refusing to admit as a real possibility one which
rests upon no positive grounds, but merely upon blank ignorance.23” (Paton, vol. 1 181)
22 Here, Allison echoes Berkeley: “But say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind, yet there
may be things like them whereof they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind, in an
unthinking substance.  I answer, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a color or figure can be like nothing but
another color or figure.” (Berkeley, 52)  Here Berkeley is palatable.
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 This passage is preceded by a discussion of the ‘coloured spectacles analogy’:
“If we put on a pair of blue spectacles, it is possible (in default of other evidence) that at the same
time the whole world really turns blue.  It is also possible that the moon, as a thing-in-itself, is made of
green cheese.  The supposition that things-in-themselves might be spatial and temporal is of the same
order.” (Paton, vol. 1 181)
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The notion of “real possibility” is distinct from logical possibility. First, though the
similarity thesis is logically possible, Allison, in Berkeleyan stride, implores us to consider just
how similar something absolutely dependent on the mind’s mode of cognition could be to
something absolutely independent of the mind’s mode of cognition. The similarity thesis is prima
facie implausible.  Moreover, the nature of this vacuity – i.e., the vacuity of the proposition that
there are things in themselves that are qualitatively similar to the spatial and temporal predicates
of empirical objects or, to the space and time of perception – is made clear by Kant’s remarks on
the difference between critical and dogmatic objections.  Accordingly, we may make a critical
objection to the thesis, and from the critical standpoint, the thesis is utterly vacuous.
“The critical objection, because it leaves the proposition untouched in its worth or worthlessness,
and impugns only on the proof, does not at all need to have better acquaintance with the object or to
pretend to better acquaintance with it; it shows only that the assertion is groundless, not that it is
incorrect.”(A 388)
Hence, within the Kantian theoretic, the similarity thesis is easily dismissed as groundless – as
not a real possibility – and this critical refutation coupled with the logical impossibility of the
qualitative or numerical equivalence thesis warrants the rejection of the neglected alternative,
It is clear that Paton is relying on the analogy to understand the utter ‘groundlessness’ of the neglected alternative.
Indeed, “…the supposition that things-in-themselves might be spatial and temporal is of the same order… ” (Paton,
vol.1 181) as the case of the world turning out to be the same colour as the coloured spectacles.  Let us explicitly put
the two cases in juxtaposition: space and time may characterize the way the world appears to us, while also
characterizing things in themselves; objects must look blue as a result of the coloured spectacles, but nevertheless
are, unbeknownst to us, independently blue.  The ‘coloured spectacles analogy’, though not implying the numerical
or qualitative sameness thesis – the ‘blue’ seen through the glasses is still, technically, a result of the glasses, and
therefore it has the quality of being dependent on the glasses, and hence cannot be qualitatively or numerically
identical to a blue that does not have this quality – certainly is easily parlayed into the similarity thesis version of the
neglected alternative.  While the higher order agnosticism we see in this passage with regard to things in themselves
is a prudent ‘critical’ stance, it undermines the thesis of transcendental idealism, insofar as TI is a complete rejection
of the notion that space and time may, for all we know, be things in themselves.  Nevertheless, an, as it were,
‘critical refutation’, or demonstration of the utter groundlessness of a possibility, is, at the level of deep-seated
theoretical agnosticism, a concession of its possibility.  As we have seen, Allison goes further in providing a
Berkeley-esque rebuttal against the similarity thesis, however, even Allison must back off from the verge of a
‘dogmatic objection’, asserting that the similarity thesis is a “vacuous” assertion, and curbing the conclusion that it
is instead impossible.
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and the move from the a priori formal epistemic status of space and time to their transcendental
ideality.
It has been argued up to this point that the notion of a priori formal epistemic conditions
of experience is conceptually loaded, and entails the complete transcendental idealist thesis.  We
have moved through the logical consequences of this notion in order to understand the
justification for, and nature of, transcendental idealism.  To review, we have seen that the
transcendental ideality of the space and time of perception follows from recognizing them as the
forms of sensibly intuiting.  We have seen that the concession of a priori formal epistemic
conditions of experience alone commits us to relegate the objects of perception to the status of
appearance in the transcendental sense.  However, the consideration that the a priori formal
conditions of objects depend on a relation to the mind’s mode of cognition is not sufficient for
claiming that correlates of such conditions cannot additionally be things in themselves. The
rejection of the neglected alternative, then, demanded further considerations.  The rejection of
the neglected alternative was necessary for completing the transcendental idealist picture. The
dismantling of this objection rests on understanding that the space and time of perception
depends on a nexus that contains a necessary reference to the mind’s mode of cognition. This is
sufficient to distinguish the space and time of perception from anything that could, ex hypothesi,
be things in themselves.  Thus, proving that space and time are the forms of sensibly intuiting
would be a sufficient proof of their transcendental ideality.  This is exactly the primary method
of argumentation Kant adopts in TA.  However, before we assess this argument, let us first
provide some grounds for the view that transcendental idealism is consistent with direct realism
by affirming what transcendental idealism is not.
23
D) Transcendental (Formal) Idealism vs. Empirical (Material) Idealism
I)  General Remarks
To understand Kant’s doctrine of transcendental idealism (formal idealism), we must first
lay out the distinction between Kant’s transcendental idealism and Berkeley’s transcendental
realism.  Berkeley’s transcendental realist stance rests on his adherence to the ontological
principle, esse est percipi.24  Transcendental realism25 is the epistemological view that the mode
of our cognition does not determine the structure of objects of cognition, and that we know
their phenomenal characteristics, as Berkeley’s ontological principle asserts, we (barring the
exception to this rule explicated in footnote 24) do perceive things as they are in themselves,
24
 For Kant objects of inner sense conform to the ontological principle esse est percipi, yet they are not for this
reason things in themselves.  Allison devotes an entire chapter to the discussion of the doctrine of inner sense (see:
Allison (1983), pp. 255-71).  Allison writes:
“…[T]he transcendental distinction to the object of inner sense becomes, to say the least,
extremely problematic…The problem here is that representations, as mental entities, are themselves ideal in
the empirical sense…[Therefore], we seem to be without any basis for distinguishing such an object as it
appears and how it is in itself.” (Allison, (1983), 263)
Nevertheless, Allison states:
 “…Kant can claim that the objects of inner experience are appearances, represented according to
the form of their appearing in consciousness.” (Allison (1983), 269)
The self and its states, i.e., the objects of inner sense, are inner phenomena, and accord with the ontological principle
esse est percipi.  However this fact, Allison claims, does not force Kant to be committed to TR regarding inner
phenomena.  Rather, these entities are transcendentally ideal, i.e., they are “…a representation of the object only as
it is in relation to the subject and not as it is in itself.” (Allison, 264)  One argument for this claim is called “The Self
Affection Argument” (see: Allison (1983), 265-71).  The argument is, roughly, as follows:  It is accepted that time is
a necessary and sufficient condition of phenomenal existence (Allison, 270), but the subjective succession of the
mind is not a sufficient condition of the empirical consciousness of inner phenomena.  The latter depends on the
mind “injecting” itself and its states into an objective temporal order.  Thus, time has a dual-status, as both a
subjective and objective succession.  Experience of inner phenomenal objects is only possible in the latter, objective
time, in which inner phenomena are characterized as causally conditioned events, which are “…coextensive with the
phenomenal world.” (Allison, 270)  The mind therefore imposes a transcendentally ideal form which stands between
such phenomena in themselves and our experience of such phenomena – between the experience of such phenomena
and their occurrence in the subjective (or mere) succession of the mind.  Therefore, the self and its states are, despite
being absolutely phenomenal, only experienced qua appearances.  This type of argument, however, has no place in
Berkeley, and may be taken as the exception that, as it were, proves the rule; if such sophisticated and complex
theoretical commitments are needed in order to allow Kant the view that absolutely phenomenal entities are not
transcendentally real, then we may rest assured that the rule (i.e., that the commitment to the ontological principle
esse est percipi commits one to TR) is, when applied to Berkeley, apt.
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 It is important to note that transcendental realism may be called formal realism in the sense that, what for Kant
are, the formal features of objects are taken (ex hypothesi) to be things in themselves, i.e., apart from the mind.
things in themselves through perception (Gardner, 275-6).  Now, if things do not extend beyond
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since things are absolutely phenomenal, and are immediately accessible since they, by definition,
lay entirely in our perceptual episodes.26
The lack of criteria for distinguishing illusory from veridical perception in Berkeley’s
doctrine is a function of his deep-seated empiricism and transcendental (formal) realism.  For
Berkeley objects are ontologically dependent on being perceived. They are all ontologically akin
to pain (pain conceived under the traditional view27); here perception merely means “…bare
sensing consciousness.” (Gardner, 275)  Objects are fully constituted at the point of their
inception in sensation, and are perceived as they are in themselves.  Therefore, anything sensed
is as “objective” as anything else sensed, since the objective status of a thing, the thing being a
mental entity, is constituted merely in its being in sensing consciousness.  It is easily seen how
this renders the distinction between veridical and illusory experience obsolete, since accordingly
all which is in sensing consciousness belongs on the same ontological plane.
On the other hand, formal idealism asserts that objects of cognition are appearances, and
do not have their formal organization in themselves.  Accordingly, formal idealism makes room
for the veridical/illusory distinction, because more is required from a thing, other than its mere
inception in sensation, for it to be objective.  Formal idealism confers a priori restrictions on
objects of experience. Therefore, not everything is on the same ontological plane, since the
things given in sensation can fail to satisfy the formal conditions of experience and objectivity,
26
 It is worth noting that for Berkeley an object is coextensive with a perceptual state.  In this sense truth understood
as correspondence between a perceptual state and its object becomes redundant. For Berkeley a perceptual state
could not fail to correspond to its object; every perception would be veridical.  The notion of correspondence is only
non-redundant if perceptions can turn out to be false.  Otherwise, correspondence of the perceptual state and its
object is implied by the perceptual state alone.  A non-redundant statement of correspondence between perceptual
state x and object y depends on a stronger distinction between the object and the perceptual state.  Kant states that he
presupposes the correspondence theory of truth:  “What is truth? The nominal definition of truth, namely that it is
the agreement of cognition with its object, is here granted and presupposed…” (A 58)  If we take Kant as adhering
to a non-redundant notion of correspondence, he cannot be a Berkeleyan.
27
 This view takes pain as an object of consciousness as opposed to a mode of being conscious of an object (i.e.,
one’s body).
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and consequently veridicality.  Hence, Kant’s doctrine is distinguished from Berkeley’s doctrine,
and indeed surpasses it, in this respect viz., by establishing the possibility of discerning veridical
from illusory perception – Berkeley has no way of allowing for error.28  If there is no room for
error, there is no distinguishing veridical from illusory experience; all perception would be
veridical.29
More to the point, for Kant the possibility of an actual perception of a particular object is
not a formal criterion, nor a logical extension of formal criteria, of the grounded existence of that
object or of its status as an object of experience.  This is in stark contrast to Berkeleyan idealism,
since that which is unperceivable, under Berkeley’s ontological principle esse est percipi, does
not exist.  Kant writes,
“The postulate for cognizing the actuality of things requires perception, thus sensation of which
one is conscious – not immediate perception of the object itself the existence of which is to be cognized,
but still its connection with some actual perception in accordance with the analogies of experience, which
exhibit all real connection in an experience in general.” (A 225)
“All that the rule requires is that the advance from appearances be to appearances; for even if these
latter yield no actual perceptions (as is the case when for our consciousness they are too weak in degree to
become experience), as appearances they nonetheless still belong to possible experience.” (A 522/B 550)
“All that can be added to my understanding is something beyond agreement with the formal
conditions of experience, namely connection with some perception or other; but whatever is connected with
this in accordance with empirical laws is actual, even if it is not immediately perceived.”  (B 284)
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 Indeed, veridical perception is markedly historico-phenomenologically different than illusory perception.
29
 It is left open for Berkeley to embrace this as a positive consequence of his theory.  However, it certainly does not
accord with our ordinary view on perception, where it is assumed that perceptions may turn out to be false. Apart
from Berkeley’s empirical idealism, following in Cartesian suit we may make the general claim that the inability to
draw differences between illusory and veridical experience opens the door to arguments from illusion, and in turn
problematic idealism.  Nevertheless, if it is not possible that perceptions may be false, the argument from illusion
cannot be formulated.
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We see from these passages that the actual perception of a particular empirical entity is
not required for that empirical entity to have a grounded existence.30 Nevertheless, such entities
must connect-up with objects of our actual perception, qua elements of the world of appearance
in accordance with the Analogies and empirical laws.
“… [P]ossible experience…is defined in terms of conformity to a set of a priori conditions
(conditions of the possibility of experience), not in terms of the possibility of a perceptual state.”
(Allison (1983), 34) These entities may even be principally unperceivable, perhaps due to their
small mass – e.g., atoms.  Nevertheless, entities that are presupposed in our explanations or
understandings of phenomena, that which are empirically connected with perceived appearances,
are legitimated as to their existence.
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is a far cry from the type of mind-dependence a Berkeleyan, or any phenomenalist ontology qua
ontology of absolutely mental entities, is committed to.
II)  Delving into a Non-Sequitur
In P.F. Strawson’s admired interpretation of the Critique, The Bounds of Sense, we are
acquainted with a particular reading of Kant’s transcendental idealism that paints it as a wobbly
metaphysical animal riddled with incoherency and unintelligibility, as an unnecessary doctrine
that is extricable from the philosophically prodigious argument of the Critique. One aspect of
Strawson’s analysis which is of particular negative consequence to the project of interpreting
Kant’s TI as consistent with direct realism, is that he sets TI on a par with phenomenal idealism
30 For explanation of ‘grounded existence’, recall discussion on p. 7-8.
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 Whether this means that there is a tertium quid placed between us and things in themselves, i.e., a new entity
Outer appearances, as appearances, are mind-dependent; they depend on the mediation of
the formal contributions of minds with the material contributions of things in themselves.   This
created from the mixture of reality and mind, will be explored in subsequent discussion.
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even if at arm’s length from Berkeley.  Though we have distinguished TI from phenomenal
idealism in the previous section, this issue requires further attention.  Strawson writes:
“It is simply that among the effects of things as they are in themselves are some states of
consciousness which we are constrained to regard as perceptions of bodies in space; and apart from these
perceptions bodies are nothing at all. 32”  (Strawson, 57)
“What actually exists as the outcome of the quasi-causal A-relation [the relation wherein the
transcendental subject is affected by the transcendental object vis a vis receptivity and the acquired material
is given formal structure vis a vis the understanding] is nothing but experience itself, the temporally ordered
series of conceptualized and connected intuitions.  Although…it is necessary that these should include at
least some having the character of perceptions of law-governed objects (bodies in space and time) enjoying
their own states and relations irrespective of the occurrence of any particular states of awareness of them,
yet bodies in space do not actually exist, enjoying their own states and relations independently of the
occurrence of any states of awareness of them.  Apart from perceptions, they are really nothing at all.”
(Strawson, 237)
This interpretation of TI misconstrues Kant’s remarks concerning the necessity of the existence
of physical bodies.  It is clear that Strawson is proposing that TI does not uphold the actual
existence of physical bodies, but merely commits us in experience to conceive certain
perceptions as perceptions of spatial objects, the existence of which does not extend beyond their
immediate perception. But what is the basis for this claim?  Let us explore the rationale behind
the claim that spatial existents, under the transcendental idealist framework, are nothing outside
of immediate perception.
32 Rather, transcendental idealism is a supreme commitment to physical objects of experience, the likes of which we
are constrained, under their transcendental reflection, to conceive as ‘effects’ of things in themselves.
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How, supposedly, do we get from transcendental idealism, i.e., the subjective origination
of space and spatial predicates, to the perception-dependency of spatial existents in the above
sense?  Well, perhaps through the following reasoning: under TI the object of perception’s
spatial form is conferred upon it through its being perceived.  That is, a condition of an object’s
spatial organization is its being taken up in immediate perception, and its spatial form, and hence
its spatial existence, is thereby subtracted where one subtracts perceiving it.  However, an
object’s formal character is not conferred upon it through its being immediately perceived, but
through its being an object of possible experience, the conditions of which do not include its
immediate perception, but rather have to do with its congruence with a set of formal conditions
(i.e., the categories, and the forms of sensibility).  Why should we concede that spatial existents
cease to exist outside of immediate perception if their spatial organization obtains in virtue of
their being objects of possible experience – because of their belonging to the nexus of
appearances – and not in virtue of their being objects of immediate perception?  The immediate
perception of an object is not a necessary condition of the object’s spatial organization, and
therefore ceasing to perceive the object does not imply a negation of its spatial form.
It must be noted that even if spatial existents in immediate perception were genuinely
outer (i.e., non-mental), if a condition of their spatiality was their being perceived, the ‘realism’
of direct realism could not be supported. That is, if it were the case that non-mental spatial
existents were created in or during perception, and a condition of their spatial existence was such
actual perception, such spatial objects would be transient despite being non-ideal.  For, “[Kant] is
careful to insist that outer sense is experience of things outside me and not the creation
(Erdichtung) of objects or mere imagination of outer things, which would leave outer existence
unproved.” (Collins, 48)  Thus, in this sense we may distinguish considerations about what TI
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implies as to the intra-mentality of spatial objects as opposed to what TI implies as to the mere
perception-dependency of such objects.  Let us now examine conflating TI with the ideality of
spatial existents.
The transcendental ideality of space does not entail that spatial existents are ‘inner’
realities.  First, space is categorically different than the ‘intra-mental’; if we take Kant’s
inner/outer sense distinction seriously, one must say that to reside in perceptual space (that is, to
reside in the world brought to us by categorically informed33 outer intuition) is the direct
opposite of something’s having an intra-mental residence.  Kant states:  “Time can no more be
intuited externally than space can be intuited as something in us.” (A 23)  Since objects of
perception are necessarily in and occupy perceptual space, they are not intra-mental entities.
Further, just because space is perceiver-dependent (not to be confused with perception-
dependent) does not mean that the spatial is inside the mind.  The following remark made by
Kevin Hill, in his ambitious book Nietzsche’s Critiques, which argues for a strong continuity
between many of Kant’s and Nietzsche’s positions, illustrates this:
“For an analogy, consider the assignment of a particular colour value to a pixel by software
generating a virtual reality environment.  This formal structure cannot be identified with phenomenological
or physical space, any more than the virtual space produced by a particular piece of software can be
identified with the structural features of the software responsible for the space having the character that it
does.” (Hill, 153)
We need not identify the ontological status of the product (i.e., perceptual space) with the
ontological status of that which produces (i.e., the formal structures of the mind)).  Given that,
according to TI, spatial existents are products of subjective activities only insofar as their form is
33 …and hence, temporally formed intuition.
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concerned, and that that which is formed is input from genuinely external, mind independent
sources, equating the ontological status of spatial existents with the ontological status of that
which produces their formal organization is questionable. Likewise, an object perceived in
spatial form is perceived through the form of space, and the object’s subjective organization does
not detract from its non-mental or non-ideal status.
If the transcendental ideality of space itself necessitated the ideality of spatial existents,
then such objects certainly would be nothing outside of immediate perception.  But the ideality
of space, qua formal condition of sensibility, does not entail the ideality of spatial existents.
Though we experience spatial objects through the lens of an ideal space34 (and space is, in a
sense, ‘in us’), saying that spatial objects are for this very reason ideal is like saying that objects
viewed through a telescope are, ipso facto, in the telescope.  In short, moving simply from the
transcendental ideality of space to the empirical ideality of spatial existents involves a (rather
familiar) conflation of the mode through which we are conscious of the object with the object of
consciousness itself.
III) Kant’s Innocuous Use of ‘Representation’: Collins’ Approach
Kant explains his rationale for the second edition of the Critique in its preface.  He
writes:
“Concerning this second edition, I have wanted, as is only proper, not to forgo the opportunity to
remove as far as possible those difficulties and obscurities from which may have sprung several
misunderstandings into which acute men, perhaps not without some fault on my own part, have fallen in
their judgment of this book.  I have found nothing to alter either in the propositions themselves or in their
34
 We need not take the lens, or coloured spectacles, analogy as implying the ontological equivalency thesis
regarding the spatiotemporal object and the thing in itself, though it may well be taken as suggestive of it.  Further,
while it may be permissible to say that the thing being represented is the thing in itself, this fact alone would not
conclusively factor in on the question of this distinction either.  For it may well be that what appears is the thing in
itself; the appearance may nevertheless be ontologically distinct from that which appears.  Ontological dependence
does not imply ontological equivalence.
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grounds of proof, or in the form and completeness of the book’s plan; this is to be ascribed partly to the
long period of scrutiny to which I have subjected them prior to laying it before the public; and partly to the
constitution of the matter itself…” (B xxxvii)
Kant accepts some responsibility in his reader’s misunderstandings, and the second publication
was, according to Kant, an exercise in transparency.
There is perhaps nothing more conducive to a phenomenal-idealist interpretation of the
Critique than Kant’s use of the term representation.35  The term has a long history of being used
in philosophical discourse to refer to mental entities, so much so that it has become natural to
interpret it as having the prefix ‘mental’ attached to it.  It is as if these terms are joined at the hip.
Further, Kant in some instances does use representation to refer to mental entities (Collins, 49),
and it is not hard to imagine one ‘fixing’ this sense to the term throughout the Critique as a
whole.  However, the term has a larger theoretical workload for Kant; its sense varies (Collins,
47).  The fact that Kant assigns additional senses to representation is perhaps pardonable as a
function of the complexity of the issues he deals with and the terminological difficulty of
conveying them.
In his work entitled: Possible Experience: Understanding Kant’s Critique of Pure
Reason, Arthur Collins devotes an entire chapter to disentangling the meaning of the term
representation in the Critique.  Collins finds that Kant designates more than one sense to the
term, and that, in light of its differing senses its employments cohere with Kant’s direct realist
commitments and overall doctrine.  Indeed, as Collins’ writes: “The terminology is inconsistent,
but the doctrine is not.” (Collins, 45)
The fundamental tension surrounding Kant’s use of the term representation for any direct
35 Vorstellung
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realist is its frequent employment in characterizing outer physical objects.  When reading the
Critique one is inevitably acquainted with this manner of speaking, but perhaps the most striking,
maximally phenomenalistic sounding pronouncement of this characterization (i.e., of outer
physical objects as representations) is made in the following passage from The Fourth
Paralogism:
“The transcendental idealist, on the contrary, can be an empirical realist, hence, as he is called, a
dualist, i.e., he can concede the existence of matter without going beyond mere self-consciousness and
assuming something more than the certainty of representations in me, hence the cogito ergo sum.  For
because he allows this matter and even its inner possibility to be valid only for appearance – which,
separated from our sensibility, is nothing – matter for him is only a species of representations (intuition),
which are called external, not as if they related to objects that are external in themselves but because they
related perceptions to space, where all things are external to one another, but that space itself is in us…But
now external objects (bodies) are merely appearances, hence also nothing other than a species of my
representations, whose objects are something only through these representations, but are nothing separated
from them.” (A 370-71)
It appears that phenomenal idealism is present in the above passage; most notably it appears that
Kant is providing an existence proof of spatial objects on the Berkeley-esque premise that they
are really mere contents of the mind.    While defusing the phenomenalistic force of this passage
requires more than an anti-phenomenal idealist reinterpretation of the term representation, this
would certainly be a giant and necessary step in that direction.
According to Collins, “…Kant sometimes allows the term representation to cover outer
empirical objects by virtue of their irreducible subjectivity.” (Collins, 47)
“…Kant’s use of representation…shifts from one context to another.  When he is concerned to
reinforce the exclusion of things in themselves as objects of consciousness, outer things, which are surely
appearances, are likely to fall within the denotation of ‘representation’ ”.  (Collins, 49)
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Spatial organization is a necessary characteristic of outer objects.  This is because of the formal
parameters of outer sense. These objects, qua spatial things, are conditioned by us.  For this
reason, they are not things in themselves; their spatiality is predicated on the way they are
subjectively represented, or even their relation to the subject in general.  However, outer spatial
objects are not for this reason mental representations.  For a useful though limited analogy, let us
once more consider the analogy of wearing coloured glasses.36  We might naturally speak of the
objects seen through the coloured glasses as being represented as having the colour red.  In a
similar vein, the forms of sensible intuition represent external inputs to us in spatial and temporal
organization.  We look through the ideal forms of space and time to the spatial objects in much
the same way we look through the coloured glasses to the coloured objects.  Suppose in the
glasses case that the object was not really red, and that the colour is therefore not attached to the
object as it is in itself; in this case the colour is only attached to the object for the one wearing
36In numerous passages Paton adopts this analogy.  In the section, “Co-operation of Mind and Reality” (Paton, 581
vol. 1), the analogy is used for a general explanation of Kant’s empirical realism. Paton writes:
“Kant’s doctrine asserts that the matter of experience is given to the mind by an independent
reality, while the form of experience is imposed by the mind itself.  It may be objected that such a co-
operation between mind and reality is impossible: thought must either determine its object through and
through, or else it must do nothing but apprehend what is given.  I do not see why this should be so.  It is
impossible to get a precise analogy for Kant’s view, but if we look at the world through blue spectacles, it
is the spectacles which make the world look blue; yet the spectacles do not by themselves determine the
difference in the shades of blue belonging to different objects.” (Paton, 581 vol. 1)
While this analogy has its drawbacks (e.g., whereas colour may, ex hypothesi, be conceived as a property of things
in themselves, space and time, qua formal features, cannot.  Thus, this analogy is inappropriate in that it suggests the
neglected alternative (Allison (1983), 114)), these problems may largely be ignored here.  Additionally, the
spectacles example here does seem to sway us towards the view that the object of appearance is ontologically
equivalent to the object in itself; the notion that we look through the spectacles to the external objects seems to
suggest this:  we are seeing through the coloured glasses one and the same object, despite its change in colour, as the
one seen without the glasses.  Moreover, Collins takes Kant’s typical formulation of the appearance/thing in itself
distinction to be suggestive of this view:
“…the concept of the “thing-in-itself” and of contrasting appearances is never presented as an
ontological distinction by Kant.  Kant usually includes some version of the longer epithet ‘things
considered as they are in themselves,’ versus ‘things considered as they appear to us,’ and when he does
not, this idea is implied…” (Collins, 58)
I will take up this issue, as well as some of the apparent complications the ‘coloured spectacles analogy’ incites with
regard to my analyses, in chapter three.
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the glasses.  The case of formal features is loosely similar: spatial and temporal predicates are
not (and, in disanalogy with the glasses case, it seems cannot be) predicates of the object in itself,
but are only predicates of the appearance.  If we understand the role of Kant’s forms in instances
of perception along these lines, then there is no reason to bring in the notion of a mental
representation.  For there is nothing extraordinary about the coloured object seen through the
coloured glasses, and likewise, there need be nothing mental about a spatiotemporal object that is
perceived in space and time because of our formal cognitive powers, though in both cases the
way in which the object appears is perceiver-dependent.
Though there is much more that needs to be said on this subject, and indeed we have not
tackled the Kantian passage set forth at the outset (to successfully interpret this passage in anti-
phenomenal idealist terms would require a more complete backdrop), the concept of
ammunition for an anti-phenomenal idealist reading of the Critique.
IV)  Material Transcendental Conditions
a)  General Remarks
Kant affirms that the realm of possible experience is a domain of objects that are
subsumed under transcendental conditions.37  There are necessary formal constraints on sensible
intuition.  The form of sensible intuition is “…that which so determines the manifold of
appearance that it allows of being ordered in certain relations” (A 20/B 34).  Now, we have
37
 Consider formal conditions in the following way: formal conditions are the pillars or presuppositions of our bridge
to objects.  If space and time weren’t formal conditions of sensibility, they could be things in themselves.  But
because they are, they are attributes of the bridge (the mind’s mode of receptivity), and mutadis mutandis of the
material that cross the bridge (enter into intuition).
‘representation’ articulated by Collins which is given a description here certainly contains
articulated that the forms of sensible intuition are epistemic subjective conditions of sensibly 
intuiting, i.e., that they are features of our faculty of representation, and how this entails the
35
Kant takes the metaphilosophical standpoint that, as Karl Ameriks puts it, “…we are all
finite receptive subjects, ‘receptive’ to something existent that we are not responsible for; and
that we all may continue to assume this (as we all do), without any ground to believe
otherwise…” (Ameriks, 283-84). 38  Kant, in considering the nature of the forms of sensible
intuition, articulates this standpoint.  Kant writes:
“If one will not make them into objective forms of all things, then no alternative remains but to
make them into subjective forms of our kind of outer as well as inner intuition, which is called sensible
because it is not original, i.e., one through which the existence of the object of intuition is itself given (and
that, so far as we can have insight, can only pertain to the original being); rather it is dependent on the
existence of the object, thus it is possible only insofar as the representational capacity of the subject is
affected through that. 39” (B 72)
 In step with Allison, we may call this standpoint the anthropocentric paradigm.40
Sensible receptivity is distinguished from intuition along the following lines: an intuition is, as
Kant puts it, “…whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may relate to objects,
that through which it relates immediately to them…” (A 19/B 33), while sensible receptivity is
“… [t]he capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the way in which we are
38
 In Cartesian stride, one could hypothesize the subject not only to be the grounds of formal conditions but also of
the material elements of empirical intuition, material being generated via  “…some unknown “hidden faculty” of the
mind (Allison (1983), 302);  Purportedly, Kant’s RI dismantles this skeptical charge.
39
 Here we encounter Kant applying the term ‘sensible’ to both inner and outer intuition.  While there is perhaps a
sense in which inner intuitions are a species of sensible intuitions, i.e., in the sense that they are not ‘original’, and
that they do depend “…on the representational capacity of the subject…” being affected by an object, there are
significant differences in the way that inner intuitions and outer intuitions have their connection with an affecting
object.  And since inner intuitions are a function of ‘inner sense’, and ‘inner sense’, as we shall see, cannot be said to
have its own capacity of sensible receptivity, there is a sense in which “...sensation…is no part of inner sense…”
(Collins, 114)
40 This is in contrast to the “Theocentric model” (see Allison (1983), pp. 19-25).
appearances, and not rather things as they are in themselves.
ideality of the formal organization of objects of experience, and that these objects per se are
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affected by objects …” (A 19/B 33).  Thus, “[o]bjects are therefore given to us by means of
sensibility, and it alone affords us intuitions…” (A 19/B 33).  Intuitions are the content of
experience immediately related to objects, while sensible receptivity is the mode of our relation
to objects, it is that through which we acquire intuitions of the outer world.
The fact that the forms of intuition are forms of sensibility is fundamental to TI.  Kant
states that the form of intuition is grounded on the constitution of our sensibility (A 252). The
demonstration of TI depends on demonstrating that space and time are forms of sensibility.
Conceivably, this demonstration would ipso facto demonstrate the soundness of the
anthropocentric paradigm.  However, we have not yet provided the grounds to rule out that the
anthropocentric paradigm is, as the preceding remarks by Ameriks seem to suggest, merely
something that is assumed.
Because objects of possible experience are conditioned by the epistemic parameters set
forth by our subjective constitution, considering such objects under their empirical description is
a consideration of them as appearances, and not, alternatively, as things in themselves.  Now,
there are two interpretations of how the reference to things in themselves under the
transcendental framework is legitimated.  The first interpretation is what Allison calls, perhaps
rather misleadingly, the “causal interpretation”, according to which “…the reference to things in
themselves is not only admissible but necessary because of the need to acknowledge a ‘cause’ or
‘ground’ of appearances.” (Allison (1983), 239).  The second interpretation is what Allison calls
the “semantic approach”, according to which the concept of appearance logically implies the
concept of a thing in itself (Allison (1983), 240) – loosely, bundled with a consideration of
something as an appearance is the notion of something that appears, with the notion of
representation, the notion of that which is represented.  A palatable formulation of the “causal
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interpretation” is expressed by Ameriks when he discusses this view in connection with a
passage from the Critique:
  “ ‘… [A]ppearances…do not count for any more than they are in fact, namely not for things in
themselves… [They] must have grounds that are not appearances’ (A 536/B575).  That is, the empirical
data require something conditioning them, something thought of as itself not empirically conditioned, and
hence something that is in that sense unconditioned.  There is a “smoking gun” in the text after all, a kind
of ‘spectre’ that is not fully ‘exorcised’.” (Ameriks, 287)
In this passage it is observed that the notion of something conditioned analytically implicates
something unconditioned that, as it were, does the conditioning, else an infinite regress.
Therefore, appearances, qua conditioned, require an unconditioned ground.41
Kant devotes attention to the causal interpretation and semantic approach in numerous
passages within the Critique, two of which are the following:
“…[I]t follows naturally from the concept of an appearance in general that something must
correspond to it which is not in itself appearance, for appearance can be nothing for itself and outside of our
kind of representation; thus, if there is not to be a constant circle, the word “appearance” must already
indicate a relation to something the immediate representation of which is, to be sure, sensible, but which in
itself, without this constitution of our sensibility…must be something, i.e., an object independent of
sensibility.” (A 251-52)
“All representations, as representations, have their object, and can themselves be objects of other
representations in turn.  Appearances are the only objects that can be given to us immediately, and that in
them which is immediately related to the object is called intuition.  However, these appearances are not
things in themselves, but themselves only representations, which in turn have their object, which therefore
41
 Allison claims that the causal interpretation undermines the ontological equivalency thesis:  “An obvious problem
with this interpretation is that it requires that we take the appearance and the corresponding thing in itself as two
distinct entities.” (Allison (1983), 240)  However, is it not possible that part of that which figures in the production
of appearances is ontologically equivalent to that which it produces?  The supposition that cause and effect are
ontologically distinct cannot be held as in any way true of things in themselves.
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cannot be further intuited by us, and that may therefore be called the non-empirical, i.e., transcendental
object = X.” (A 108-09)
In these passages Kant observes that the objects of experience, as appearances, are a species of
representation, the concept of which is analytically connected with the notion of a thing
represented.  It is conceivable, and in the case of conceptual representation (i.e., judgment), even
necessary, that the object of a representation may yet be another representation.  For instance,
Kant states:
“Since no representation pertains to the object immediately except intuition alone, a concept is
thus never immediately related to an object, but is always related to some other representation of it
(whether that be an intuition or itself already a concept).  Judgment is therefore the mediate cognition of an
object, hence the representation of a representation of it.” (B 93)
However, ultimately we must conceive of something represented that is not itself a
representation; otherwise we encounter an infinite regress.  In the case of outer appearances, qua
the base representational structures within the transcendental framework42, the buck, as it were,
stops here; we must ultimately conceive of appearance as representing a non-representational
object.  Something non-representational will be non-empirical, since all empirical entities are
inherently representations.  And since the categories are only constitutive synthetic principles in
42
 Allison writes:
“It should also be noted, however…that the possibility of outer experience is not…conditioned by
inner experience.  Since it provides the data necessary for the determinate representation of time, outer
experience can be said to ‘wear the trousers.’ ” (Allison (1983), 304)
However, one must keep in mind that it is the determinate representation of time which is conditioned by outer
experience, and not, rather, the original a priori indeterminate representation of time (see: footnote 57).
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their empirical employment43, our characterization of this object is empty:  i.e., something in
general = X (A 104), or the transcendental object = X. (A 109)
In the present context the commitment to the non-empirically conditioned ground of the
empirically conditioned takes shape not only within the notion of a form-conferring and
receptive transcendental subject, but within the story of the affecting, transcendental object.
b) Transcendental Affection
In the following remarks, Allison addresses the general material transcendental condition
embedded in the transcendental framework:
“If therefore, it is a necessary (material) condition of human experience that something affect the
mind, it is a necessary condition of a transcendental account of such experience that this something be
viewed as…the transcendental object…[Allison, attacking the problem of affection directly, further
writes:]...this does not commit Kant to the illegitimate postulation of any superempirical, unknowable
entities.  The point is only that insofar as such entities are to function in a transcendental context as material
conditions of human cognition, they cannot, without contradiction, be taken under their empirical
43
 The grounded application of the categories and forms of sensible intuition to objects is predicated on their (i.e.,
the categories’ and forms’) epistemic function in possible experience (“…their indispensability for the possibility of
experience itself thus establish… [them]… a priori” (B 5)), and in virtue of the objects to which they apply being
objects of possible experience.  In other words, their grounded application is constituted by transcendental
deductions.  For the reasons supplied (i.e., that it is inherently non-representational), the transcendental object is not
an object of possible experience, and hence, the application of the categories to the transcendental object, i.e.,
knowledge about the transcendental object by the mere understanding, is vacuous (or, at least indeterminate).  Thus,
Kant writes:
“… [T]he pure concepts of the understanding can never be of transcendental, but always only of
empirical use, and… the principles of pure understanding can be related to objects of the senses only in
relation to the general conditions of a possible experience, but never to things in general (without taking
regard of the way in which we might intuit them) [my emphasis].” (A 246/B 303)
“The merely transcendental use of the categories is thus in fact no use at all, and has no
determinate or even, as far as its form is concerned, determinable object.  From this it also follows that the
pure category does not suffice for any synthetic a priori principle, and that the principles of the pure
understanding are only of empirical but never of transcendental use; but nowhere beyond the field of
possible experience can there be any synthetic a priori principles.” (B 304/A 248).
For more, refer to the distinction between transcendent and transcendental use of the categories (Paton, vol. II pp.
430).  Also, see: A 296.
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description. This means that, in a purely methodological sense, they must be considered as they are in
themselves, or, equivalently, referred to collectively, as ‘the transcendental object’. [my emphasis]”
(Allison (1983), 250)
Thus, a general material transcendental condition (MTC) follows from the transcendental
commitment to the empirically unconditioned; this is situated in the story of affection. MTCs are
necessary a priori epistemic conditions of representing objects, yet they do not have their root in
the mind, i.e., they are non-subjective, but rather in the transcendental object (which in this
context is understood as equivalent to the thing in itself); after all it must be said of the affecting
object (i.e., that which is related immediately to receptivity – i.e., ‘affecting’) that the possibility
of its affecting the mind depends not only on the receptive nature of the mind, but on its own
affective nature.  As Westphal states, “…Kant's transcendental account of the necessary
conditions of self-conscious human experience entail [sic] that there is a genuine, necessary, a
priori, formal, yet also material (and mind-independent) condition for self-conscious experience,
namely, the transcendental affinity of the sensory manifold.44” (Westphal, 67)
Allison equates the transcendental object with the thing in itself in a number of places in
his section entitled, “Affection” from which this passage is taken, and he offers textual support
for this treatment.45
44
 This is at the foundation of possible experience, but not only in the above sense.  Kant conceives of receptivity as
a presupposition of the awakening of our formal faculties (B 1), and, ipso facto, as a primitive condition of the
successful generative activity of our subjective formal constitution.  Let us reserve a discussion on the implications
of this conception with regard to the apriority of the representation of space for the subsequent section devoted to the
first apriority argument (see: footnote 63).
45 Allison, in the essay entitled: “Things in Themselves, Noumena, and the Transcendental Object” (pp. 56), admits
that there must be a distinction between the transcendental object and the thing in itself.  “While it [the
transcendental object] can be generally equated with the thing as it is in itself, and there is even one passage (A 366)
wherein they are explicitly identified, there are other contexts where the two must be clearly distinguished [refer: A
109; A 250].”
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It seems this basic commitment to a MTC is further developed in the following passage in
the A version Transcendental Deduction:
“If cinnabar were now red, now black, now light, now heavy, if a human being were now changed
into this animal shape, now into that one, if on the longest day the land were covered now with fruits, now
with ice and snow, then my empirical imagination would never even get the opportunity to think of heavy
cinnabar on the occasion of the representation of the color red; or if a certain word were attributed now to
this thing, now to that, or if one and the same thing were sometimes called this, sometimes that, without the
governance of a certain rule to which the appearances are already subjected in themselves, then no
empirical synthesis of reproduction could take place. (A 100-01)
Collins interprets this passage as a concession of objective conditions of experience. As Collins
writes,
“Not every reality could be experienced.  The fact that we have experience shows not only that our
subjectively imposed categories have worked up materials into a system of objects; it also shows that the
reality that stimulates this creativity meets conditions of regularity that make it possible for it to be
represented successfully in this way.” (Collins, 148).
 Strictly, Collins’ wording invokes the reality that is represented by our categorical
representations; this is distinguished from such representations or systems of objects themselves.
What’s more, since we may take Collins to be merely addressing categorical representations, or,
categorically represented intuition, it is conceivable that the represented reality of which he
speaks, the reality which stimulates categorical organization, is the realm of mere intuition, itself
a species of representation.  However, I take Collins not to be merely stating something about a
reality of representations; he is not merely stating that spatially and temporally organized
intuitions must meet conditions of regularity in order for their categorical representations to be
42
successful; he is making a bolder claim, a claim about the affecting transcendental object.  While
Collins is claiming that regularity must be found in mere intuition in order for the categories to
be applied to it successfully, he is also claiming that a condition of this regularity is regularity in
the affecting reality itself. Hence, while it is a transcendental material condition that something
affects the mind, Collins is highlighting that part of the transcendental story is that this affection
must be of the sort that yields material that conforms to the categories (not to mention to the
forms of sensibility46). Collins is stating a condition of the possibility of material conforming to
the categories, i.e., that it meets a condition of regularity. He extends the content of the former
general material condition, i.e., that something affect the mind, into an a priori determination of
the particular content of material, namely, that it meets the regularity requirement.  However, a
condition of this regularity is, Collins maintains, regularity in the affecting object.  In short, our
faculty of sensation (a receptive capacity) receives input from an affecting object, and this
affecting object is the correlate of those sensory inputs.  It is necessary for the affecting object to
yield matter that conforms to the forms of experience.  Collins states that a condition of this
conformance in regard to the categories is that intuitive material has a degree of regularity to it,
and that this regularity in material has its root in the regularity of the affecting object.47
46
 Though Collins is here speaking only of conformance to the categories, at this point it is not problematic to add
conformance to the forms of sensible intuition as well.
47 This point appears to fly in the face of Kant’s theoretical agnosticism regarding things in themselves.  However,
Allison provides a more or less convincing way of approaching such issues.  Allison writes:
“[In] passages in which Kant appears to be making illicit claims about the nature and function of
things as they are in themselves or the transcendental object…[f]ar from providing a metaphysical story
about how the mind or noumenal self is somehow mysteriously affected by the transcendental object, they
merely stipulate how the affecting object must be conceived in the transcendental, or nonempirical, account
of the affection required for the explication of the Kantian theory of sensibility…[T]he function of the
categories in these transcendental contexts is purely logical, and does not carry with it any assumptions
about their objective reality with respect to some empirically inaccessible realm of being.”  (Allison (1983),
254)
In the present context this is clearly true.  It is merely the case that the transcendental framework compels us to
conceive the transcendental object in a certain way in order to make explicable how perception is possible.  The
problem is soluble if we take what appear to be synthetic characterizations of things in themselves to instead be
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Collins’ account is plausible.  The following is a useful though limited analogy: perhaps
one may conceive of a relation of Kant’s form to matter in the cookie-cutter sense – the
possibility of a successful cut, amongst else requires the dough, not to mention that the dough be
malleable.  That there is dough and that it is formable is a function of the dough itself, not the
cookie-cutter.  Likewise, experience demands that material is generated through the receptivity
to an affecting object, and that this material calibrates to the formal mode of experience.  Just as
the formability of the dough is a function of the nature of the dough and not the cookie-cutter,
the formability of the material provided by the affecting object is a function of the nature of the
affecting object.
However, let us take a closer look at Collins’ reasoning.  Granted that what is
categorically represented can be said to have regularity by virtue of the possibility of its being
categorically represented, but it is also the case that within Kant’s metaphysical account what are
categorically represented are first and foremost intuitions.  Thus, we may legitimately say that
intuitions must meet a condition of regularity in the case of their successful categorical
representation.  However, it is unclear how it follows that this regularity in intuition reflects
regularity in the affecting object.  First, perhaps regularity in intuition is merely a function of the
spatial and temporal organization of intuitions. That is, perhaps intuitions are sufficiently regular
for categorical representation qua their necessary spatial and temporal quality – i.e., under the
forms of our sensibility.
Regarding this possibility, since the spatial and temporal form of given intuitions may be
satisfied without achieving regularity or coherence across intuitions, and it is this type of
characterizations of how we must conceive of things in themselves within the transcendental framework.  That is,
claims regarding things in themselves are merely “…methodological directives, which specify how we must
conceive things when we consider them in abstraction from their relation to human sensibility and it’s a priori forms.
(my emphasis)” (Allison (1983), 241)
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regularity which Kant has in mind in the above remarks, we may take Kant to be stipulating a
regularity which does not originate from the brute spatial and temporal organization of material
in general. Consider again the following passage: If cinnabar were now red, now black, now
light, now heavy, if a human being were now changed into this animal shape, now into that one,
if on the longest day the land were covered now with fruits, now with ice and snow… It seems
intuitions may meet their spatial and temporal form while being subject to a type of chaotic
succession, an incoherence or irregularity.  We find support for this view again in the following
remarks:
 “Unity of synthesis in accordance with empirical concepts would be entirely contingent, and,
were it not grounded on a transcendental ground of unity, it would be possible for a swarm of appearances
to fill up our soul without experience ever being able to arise from it.  But in that case all relation of
cognition to objects would also disappear, since the appearances would lack a connection in accordance
with universal and necessary laws, and would thus be intuition without thought, but never cognition, and
would therefore be as good as nothing for us. [my emphasis]” (A 111)
The type of regularity required of intuitions in order that they are represented
categorically cannot merely be a function of intuition qua their brute spatial and temporal
organization, since the possibility that intuitions not meet the required cross-intuition regularity,
or regularity in succession, is something which is consistent with them having their brute,
indeterminate spatial and temporal quality. Perhaps by lack of any other recourse regarding
where this regularity comes from, and through the power of critical objection, Collins infers that
it originates from regularity in the affecting object.
The analytic truth that matter must conform to form is built into Kant’s transcendental
account.  From the transcendental standpoint, we may infer the regularity of material at the
outset of affirming a priori subjective (formal) conditions, provided this regularity is a condition
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of congruence between form and matter.  However, to restate, is it really also the case that, by
the same extension, we may attribute a degree of regularity to that which produces the material?
That regularity in the affecting reality is implied by regularity in material is questionable; for,
even though the spatial and temporal form of intuition is not responsible for the cross-intuition
regularity at issue here, nothing has been said which rules out that some hidden formal faculty or
aspect of the constitution of our receptivity, unbeknownst to us, is responsible for material being
regular in this sense.  Under the preceding scenario, one may account for the hypothetical
possibility of intuitions not meeting this required regularity by postulating that such regularizing
functions are fallible. If some unknown faculty is responsible for cross-intuition regularity,
regularized material may indeed spring from irregular affective objects.  And while we may rule
out that this is a real possibility through the power of critical objection, i.e., on the basis of its
utter groundlessness, as we have seen, at the level of Kant’s deep-seated theoretical agnosticism,
a critical objection involves a concession to the possibility of that to which it is directed.
If it is assumed that successful categorical representation imposes a particular constraint
on the affecting object – namely, that it must have a sufficient degree of regularity – it is a
relatively unimportant question whether additional constraints extend to the affecting object via
the mere possibility of successful intuitive representation, i.e., from the mere possibility of
something’s conforming to brute spatial and temporal form. Since the trivial truth that material
must conform to the forms of sensibility does not rule out the possibility that any affective input
whatsoever would conform to the forms of sensibility, the inference from successful intuitive
representation to a particular constraint on affecting reality is, without additional justifying
considerations, problematic.
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Nevertheless, entrenched within the transcendental framework, there is a rather weighty
commitment to a MTC. However, Allison’s formulation of the principle of the direct proof of TI
previously discussed seems to undercut a commitment to material transcendental conditions:  If
the transcendental object (i.e., affecting object) is equal to the thing in itself, and hence there
evidently are transcendental conditions which ‘reflect’ things in themselves, then there is a
tension here: this is what Allison insists leads to contradiction, a contradiction the transcendental
realist may escape from only by denying the reality of transcendental conditions all together.
Thus far in our study the transcendental object is conceived as a condition of the material
component in experience, and this establishes a non-subjective but also transcendental condition
of experience. If this is the case, we find a tension if not full contradiction in Allison’s remarks
on the fundamental premise of the proof:
“… [W]hatever is necessary for the representation or experience of something as an object, that
is, whatever is required for the recognition or picking out of what is “objective” in our experience48, must
reflect the cognitive structure of the mind (its manner of representing) rather than the nature of the object as
it is in itself.  To claim otherwise is to assume that the mind can somehow have access to an object (through
sensible or intellectual intuition) independently of the very elements that have been stipulated to be the
conditions of the possibility of doing this in the first place… [my emphasis]” (Allison (1983), 27)
The tension arises from this formulation’s universal declaration that “whatever is necessary for
the representation…of something as an object…must reflect the cognitive structure of the
mind… [my emphasis]”  However, it is the case that transcendental affection is a necessary
condition of intuition, and certainly the fact that we are affected by something cannot merely
reflect the cognitive structure of the mind (qua receptivity), but must also reflect the affective
48
 This phrase encompasses material transcendental conditions, and all other epistemic conditions.  Surely, that there
is something to represent as an object is a necessary condition of representing something as an object.
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nature of the transcendental object. Affection (the process whereby the subject is affected by
objects) is a necessary epistemic condition for the representation of objects, and this affection
does not reflect the nature of the mind, i.e., its manner of representing.  If the proof of
transcendental idealism is a proof that space and time are epistemic conditions, predicated on the
fallacious assumption that all transcendental conditions must reflect the mind’s mode of
representation, then this proof is unsound.  However, if we treat this principle as sound, then it
would follow that there are no such things as material transcendental conditions, and whatever
commitments to them Kant is constrained to make constitute a major theoretical inconsistency.
Nevertheless, I attribute the shortcomings of the preceding formulation of the principle
that, according to Allison, underlies not only the proof of transcendental idealism, but “…the
Critique as a whole…” (Allison (1983), 27)  to sloppiness on behalf of Allison; for it is certain
that he conceives the proof of TI to be a proof of space’s and time’s epistemic status qua forms.
Rather than the proof of TI resting on the premise that (universally) all epistemic conditions qua
epistemic conditions must reflect the nature of the mind, it instead rests on the more detailed
premise that space and time are epistemic conditions of a particular sort that, in virtue of their
natures qua formal conditions, lay in the mind a priori (this is the weighty sense of a priori in
Kant).  Allison’s formulation of this principle, then, is exaggerated.49  Not all epistemic
conditions, necessary conditions of representing objects, reflect the mind in the way formal
epistemic conditions do.  In the case of a material transcendental condition, it is an epistemic
condition that, because of its material nature, does not reflect the mind’s mode of representation;
49
 The description of something as vital as the principle that underlies not only the proof of transcendental idealism,
but “…the Critique as a whole…” (Allison (1983), 27) should be formulated accurately.
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it is a priori in the sense that it holds logical priority over experience50, though it is not ‘a priori’
in the special sense that formal conditions are.51
In this chapter, transcendental idealism and the contrasting position of transcendental
realism were examined. We have seen how transcendental realism takes spatial and temporal
objects to have their spatial and temporal organization in themselves, whereas transcendental
idealism takes the spatial and temporal organization of objects to be grounded only insofar as
such objects are appearances – i.e., insofar as they stand in a relation to the mind’s mode of
cognition. We discussed how the transcendental ideality of space and time follows from the
view that space and time are ‘forms of sensibly intuiting’, and how this relegates objects of
experience qua spatial and temporal objects to things as they appear, as opposed to their being
things as they are in themselves.  Moreover, considerations have been offered which deflate the
apparent conflict between TI and direct realism. It has been argued that TI is not equivalent to
Berkeleyan or ‘empirical’ idealism, that a non-sequitur is involved in moving directly from the
transcendental ideality of space to the empirical ideality or transiency of spatial existents, and
that Kant’s use of the term ‘representation’ regarding outer spatiotemporal objects may be
interpreted as not carrying with it the mentalistic implications typically associated with the term.
Finally, we examined Kant’s commitment to material transcendental conditions, and the
reference to the transcendental object embedded within the transcendental framework. With
these considerations in place, I will now provide a detailed exposition of Allison’s interpretation
of the proof of transcendental idealism found in the Transcendental Aesthetic.
50 i.e., ‘experience’ not in the absolute or maximally abstract sense of bare affection, but rather in the sense of the
empirical cognition of objects.
51
 i.e., where formal conditions have logical priority over all experience, including ‘experience’ taken in the
maximally abstract sense of bare affection.
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CHAPTER 2
THE DIRECT PROOF OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM: THE FORMAL NATURE OF
SPACE AND TIME
A) The Argument Introduced
I have argued, in accordance with Allison, that if space and time are forms of sensibly
intuiting, then they are transcendentally ideal.  If this claim is true, then demonstrating that space
and time are forms of sensibly intuiting is sufficient as a demonstration of the full thesis of
transcendental idealism. Kant takes himself to give the direct proof for TI in the Transcendental
Aesthetic, and indeed the decisive argument Kant provides is one which demonstrates that space
and time are forms of sensibly intuiting.52  This chapter will expound Allison’s interpretation of
the direct proof of transcendental idealism contained in TA. According to Allison, the general
structure of the direct proof of transcendental idealism is as follows:
Premise 1:  “… [T]he representations of space and time are a priori intuitions…”
(Allison (1983), 105)
Premise 2:  “… [A]n a priori intuition is possible, if and only if it contains or
presents to the mind a form of its own sensibility.” (Allison (1983), 105)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
52
 Kant takes himself to provide indirect proof of TI through his analyses of the antinomical conflicts which he
proposes only arise as a result of accepting the TR standpoint. The Antinomies are quelled under the standpoint of
TI.  Allison writes:  “The [indirect] proof for transcendental idealism seems to rest ultimately upon the assumption
that it provides the only possible basis for avoiding the antinomical conflict.” (Allison (1983), 51)  The argument is
indirect in the sense that it concludes that transcendental realism cannot be true.  However, since “…transcendental
realism and transcendental idealism together constitute two mutually exclusive and exhaustive metaphilosophical
alternatives…” (Allison (1983), 52), the negation of TR is an affirmation of TI.  The proof of TI contained in the
Transcendental Aesthetic is direct, since it concludes that transcendental idealism is true.  In this sense of direct and
indirect proof, the direct proof of TI would be an indirect proof of the falsity of TR.  Though a complete picture of
the grounds for TI would involve an analysis of the indirect proof of TI found in the Antinomies, this is beyond the
scope of this thesis.
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Conclusion: ∴ Space and time are forms of sensibility.
This argument is logically valid.53  What is required is a demonstration of the soundness of its
two premises.  The argument may be broken down into sub-arguments corresponding to the
claims contained within its premises.  These sub-arguments are: ‘the apriority arguments’; ‘the
intuition arguments’; and, what may be termed, the ‘how a priori intuitions are possible
53
 The implicit content is that space and time are contained or presented in the representations of space and time,
the representations of space and time thus conceived as a priori intuitions.  While the proposition that space and
time are represented in the representations of space and time is an explicit case of logical containment – and
therefore, were such a modification permissible, we could change the second premise to better reflect the logical
containment that is at issue here; i.e., let the second premise read: an a priori intuition is possible if and only if it
represents to the mind a form of its own sensibility – the notion that space and time are contained or presented in
the representation of space and time is not explicitly contained by the first premise.  Perhaps there is reason to
believe that this notion is actually implicit in the first premise. If one conceives of the representations of space and
time as a priori intuitions, and “…intuition, insofar as it is what Kant calls ‘immediate’ representation, guarantees
the presence of its object … (Prolegomena, Ak. 4, 281-82)” (Warren, 221), then, provided that space and time are
the objects of a priori intuition, the notion that space and time are contained or presented in the representations of
space and time is implied by the first premise.  However, this is precisely what we cannot do; for bearing a relation
to space qua object, requires more than “…the mere form of intuition…[but also]…the comprehension of the
manifold given in accordance with the form of sensibility in an intuitive representation…[my emphasis]”  (B 160).
The latter seems out of bounds; for whatever is contained in the a priori intuitions of space and time, it cannot be
dependent on conceptual determinations which themselves are logically posterior to the content of the a priori
intuitions themselves, and such conceptual determinations are what this “comprehension”, and thus the relation to
space and time qua objects, depends on.  Allison writes that the representation of space has precedence “…over all
spatial concepts…” (Allison (1983), 92)  Moreover, Kemp Smith writes:
“…[T]he definition which Kant gives of intuition—as knowledge which stands in
immediate relation to objects—applies only to empirical intuition.  Though by the term object
Kant, in so far as he is definite, means content, that content is such as can arise only through the action of
some independent object upon the sensibility.  In other words, the content apprehended must be sensuous.”
(Smith, 88)
And finally, in Kant’s own words:
“The mere form of intuition, without substance, is in itself not an object, but the merely formal
condition of one (as appearance), like pure space and pure time, which are to be sure something, as the
forms for intuition, but are not in themselves objects that are intuited (ens imaginarium).” (A 291/B 347)
However, this tension is soluble; despite the former limitation, “…pure intuition has an intrinsic content, and is the
immediate apprehension of that content… [my emphasis]” (Smith, 89).  Thus, while space and time as objects
cannot be presented in a priori intuition, and indeed, a priori intuitions are not immediate relations to objects, it is
nevertheless conceivable, and even necessary, that what is immediately apprehended or presented in outer and inner
a priori intuitions are space and time, respectively – space and time conceived as content.  As we shall see, the
second apriority argument brings to the fore this aspect that the representation of space has its own content,
“…which remains when abstraction is made from everything empirical.” (Allison (1983), 89)  As it turns out, the
content of the representation of space is extension and figure, and thus it seems quite natural to say that space itself
is contained or presented in the representation of space (much the same may be said, mutandis mutatis, about the
representation of time).  There is more to be said concerning the proper conception of a priori intuition and its
overall theoretical stability within Kant’s system.  Attention will be given to such matters in the subsequent section:
A Priori Intuition.
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argument’. I will now examine these arguments (with the exception of the ‘second intuition
argument’), beginning with the ‘apriority arguments’.
B)  The Apriority of the Representation of Space (and Time54)
I)  First Argument
Kant provides two arguments for the apriority of the representation of space in the
section: “The Transcendental Aesthetic:  First Section:  On Space—Metaphysical exposition of
this concept” (A 22/B 37 – A 25/B 40).55  Furthermore, both arguments establish the
representation of space’s apriority by demonstrating that the representation of space is logically
prior to outer empirical representation.  The first argument is given in the following passage:
“Space is not an empirical concept that has been drawn from outer experiences.  For in order for
certain sensations to be related to something outside me (i.e., to something in another place in space from
that in which I find myself), thus in order for me to represent them as outside one another, thus not merely
as different but as in different places, the representation of space must already be their ground.  Thus the
representation of space cannot be obtained from the relations of outer appearance through experience, but
this outer experience is itself first possible only through this representation. [my emphasis]” (A 23/B 38)
Allison maintains that there are two separate assertions contained in this argument.   The first
assertion is that the representation of space is presupposed by the representation of something
“…as distinct from the self and its states…” – for certain sensations to be related to something
outside me; the second assertion is that the representation of space has a further involvement in
54 According to Allison, “… [K]ant’s analysis of space and time parallel one another for the most part…” (Allison
(1983), 82).  This permits him to focus on Kant’s analysis of space in order to explain the argument for the
transcendental ideality of both space and time, since here the analysis of time is, for the most part, mutatis mutandis,
the same analysis as the analysis of space (Allison (1983), 82).  I will here forgo the analysis of the representation of
time.
55
 In contrast, some Kantian scholars (e.g., Smith, Paton) hold that there is actually only one argument for the
apriority thesis that spans across the two passages which Allison maintains constitutes two distinct proofs of the
thesis, respectively (Allison (1983), 82).  We will touch on how Paton’s reasoning for treating the two passages as
constituting a single proof, in light of Allison’s interpretation, rests on an unfounded objection to the first apriority
argument.
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the representation of things “…as numerically distinct from one another…” – as outside one
another (Allison (1983), 83).56  These assertions entail that the representation of space is a priori
due to its logical priority over outer empirical representations; the features encountered in
experience which could, ex hypothesi, serve to explain how we originally empirically acquire the
representation of space (e.g., Leibniz’s order of coexisting phenomena, or Locke’s simple idea of
space) would, accordingly, presuppose it (Allison (1983), 84).57  The argument may be
formulated as follows:
56
 It is easy to see how the conclusion would follow from the first assertion on its own, since, by definition, outer
sense has to do with representing “…objects as distinct from the self and its states.” (Allison (1983), 83).  No doubt
Kant includes these two assertions in order to provide a more complete picture of the role that he conceives the
representation of space plays in outer empirical representations, but from the standpoint of constituting one valid
proof of the apriority of space, this first assertion, which we will term ‘the primary line’, is all that’s required.  To
jump ahead (see the formulation of the argument on the next two pages (p. 53-4)), the primary and secondary
premises of the argument are not functionally related to one another in the argument.  That is, the conclusion does
not depend on taking these premises together, for it may validly follow from the primary or secondary lines
independently from each other.  This is so even if the secondary line falls with the primary line (see: footnote 61).
Secondary premise 1 is debatable, and even if we accept it, secondary premise 2 is perhaps suspect as well, and I
believe that the validity of the primary and secondary lines stand or fall on their own (see: footnote 61).  The
secondary line is perhaps for good measure, as it addresses how the representation of space underlies an aspect of
outer empirical representation qua a precondition of the representation of numerically distinct phenomena, but it is,
as it were, treatable as a second argument.
57 “Outer sense” is the faculty through which we can represent “…objects as distinct from the self and its states.”
(Allison (1983), 83)  This is in contrast to the faculty of “inner sense”, which allows us to represent “…the self and
its states.” (Allison (1983), 83) Kant’s own definition of these terms is the following:
“By means of outer sense (a property of our mind) we represent to ourselves objects as outside us,
and all as in space…Inner sense… [is that]…by means of which the mind intuits itself…or its inner
state…” (B 37)
The representation of time parallels the representation of space in that, just as the representation of space is logically
prior to outer empirical representation, it is logically prior to inner ‘empirical’ representation.  However, this raises
the question of whether it may be empirically acquired through outer empirical representation, since this possibility
does not suffer from the same blatant contradiction as the possibility of the condition being acquired from the thing
whose possibility it conditions.  The possibility of the representation of space being empirically acquired from inner
‘empirical’ representation is, as we shall see (see: footnote 62) ruled out; however, the possibility that the
representation of time is empirically acquired through outer empirical representation cannot be ruled out on quite the
same grounds.  It is, however, ruled out on the grounds that Kant conceives of the original representation of time as
a condition, albeit a mediate one, of outer empirical representation.  Kant writes:
“Time is the a priori formal condition of all appearances in general.  Space, as the pure form of all
outer intuitions, is limited as an a priori condition merely to outer intuitions.  But since, on the contrary, all
representations, whether or not they have outer things as their object, nevertheless as determinations of the
mind themselves belong to the inner state, while this inner state belongs under the formal condition of inner
intuition, and thus of time, so time is an a priori condition of all appearance in general, and indeed the
immediate condition of the inner intuition (of our souls), and thereby also the mediate condition of outer
appearances…all appearances in general, i.e., all objects of the senses, are in time, and necessarily stand in
relations of time.” (A 34)
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Premise 1: The representation of space is logically prior to the representation of
something “…as distinct from the self and its states…”58
Secondary Premise 1:  The representation of space is logically prior to the
representation of numerically distinct things.59
Premise 2: Outer empirical representation60 consists, by definition, of the
representation of something “…as distinct from the self and its states…”
Secondary Premise 2: Distinguishing objects from each other is a basic feature of
outer empirical representation.61
This passage is quite dense, and its theoretical ramifications are deep and far reaching.  However, it is clear that the
parallelism between the representation of space and the representation of time breaks down in the former respect.
Furthermore, it is also clear that the original representation of time is logically prior to outer empirical representation
as well as inner ‘empirical’ representation, and ipso facto it cannot be acquired from outer empirical representation.
58
 At first glance it may seem that the embodiment of the notion of logical priority in the premises of an argument
for the apriority of the representation of space is an instance of circular argument.  However, though in this case
logical priority implies apriority, logical priority and apriority are not one and the same.  This is so, since apriority
does not imply logical priority.  Logical priority marks a preconditional relationship.  Something can be a priori,
i.e., logically independent of all experience, while not being a precondition of, and hence logically prior to,
experience.  The two notions, therefore, are not equivalent, and the argument does not state its conclusion in its
premises.
59 Fischer provides some account of space and time as “…the real and only ‘principium individuationis.’ ” (Fischer,
44).  He writes:
“Without space and time, our representations would be a chaos, in which the greater part could
never be distinguished.  In space and time every representation appears at some definite point or moment
which belongs to it alone…Even though two things exist in the same time, they are separated by space;
they are simultaneous, but in different places.  Though two things be in the same place, they are severed by
time; they occupy the same place, not simultaneously, but successively.  Space, then, distinguished what
time does not; and time distinguishes what space unites.  Without them nothing, and in them everything can
be distinguished.  And that everything must be distinguishable—that there is nothing indiscernible—this is
the first condition and possibility of any knowledge…Space and time are the principles of all distinction;
they discern intuitively what the understanding cannot discern by means of any of its concepts…” (Fischer,
43-44)
60 The locution ‘outer empirical representation’ is meant to comply with Kant’s commitment to an outer a priori
representation, namely the representation of space.
61
 However, I take it that it is at least conceivable, even if only per the empiricist view, that we could have an
original outer empirical representation, a representation of something “…as distinct from the self and its states…”,
that does not consist in or depend on a representation of two numerically distinct objects.  This is predicated on the
assumption that the representation of two distinct things is not a necessary condition of the representation of one
distinct outer thing.  Insofar as this is possible, this premise would not entail that the representation of space is
universally logically prior to outer empirical intuition.  It may be objected that the representation of something as
distinct from the self and its states is necessarily a case of representing two numerically distinct things, namely
oneself and the other thing, and consequently the two lines of the argument are integrated, albeit not functionally in
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion: -direct:  The representation of space is logically prior to outer
empirical intuition. -corollary: ∴The representation of space is a priori.62
the argument.  This would be so, since the representation of something as distinct from the self and its states would
depend on or coincide with the representation of numerically distinct things.  In such a case, we could not reject the
primary line without ipso facto rejecting the secondary line, but not necessarily visa versa. – This statement is
predicated on the following argument: premise 1: (rejection of the primary premise 1) The representation of space
is not logically prior to the representation of something as distinct from the self; premise 2: The representation of
something as distinct from the self is an example of a representation of numerically distinct things; Conclusion:
therefore, the representation of space is not logically prior to the representation of numerically distinct things.
However, the reverse argument cannot be made, since even if the representation of something as numerically
distinct from the self is an instance of the representation of numerically distinct things, and the representation of
space is not logically prior to the representation of numerically distinct things, it is entirely left open that the
representation of space is nevertheless logically prior to the representation of something as distinct from the self,
since there may be some aspect of such representation other than the fact that it is an instance of the representation
of numerically distinct things that makes it so. – However, this is initially problematic for the reason that the
representation of two distinct things, even in the case of the preceding objection, presupposes the representation of
something as distinct from the self and its states.  The problem can be stated in the following way: if outer
representation is the representation of something as distinct from the self and its states, and a condition of this is the
representation of two numerically distinct things, yet this is itself predicated on representing something as distinct
from the self, this results in contradiction.  This alone, however, does not rule out the possibility of these two
conditions coinciding, or being in a dialectical relation.  Aside from this, however, we have defined inner experience
as the domain of awareness of the self and its states, and consequently the self and its states as inner phenomena.
Now, the domain of objects proper for Kant is outer sense.  If this is the case, then even though there is a numerical
distinction between the self and its states on the one hand, and an empirical entity on the other in all cases of outer
intuition, as indeed there must, this is still perhaps not a case of being a representation of numerically distinct things,
i.e., objects.  The present definition of the self and its states as inner entities rules out that they fall under outer
awareness, and as such being aware of them fails to qualify as being aware of objects proper.  Moreover, even if the
self and its states can be represented outwardly, i.e., in space, it is unlikely that representing them outwardly is a
general condition of outer empirical representation.  Nevertheless, they may still be qualified as objects in a more
relaxed definition, and if what Kant means by things includes things like the self and its states, then so be it – the
two main premises of this argument are integrated, albeit not functionally in the argument.   However, it is not as
though it appears that Kant means to include the self and its states among the things of the secondary premise; the
primary and secondary lines appear to be expressed as independent claims.  Returning to the preceding discussion, it
is unlikely that all paradigms of the empirical acquisition of the representation of space necessarily rely on the
representation of two numerically distinct things.  And therefore the secondary, or supporting, line of the argument
is unsuccessful in demonstrating the apriority of the representation of space.
In “Kant and the Apriority of Space”, Daniel Warren assesses the Allisonian interpretation of the first
apriority argument.  However, his analysis, aside from mounting criticism against this interpretation on the grounds
that it is not textually supported, takes as its object of criticism the secondary line of the argument.  However,
Warren does not seem to give much in the way of an assessment of the primary line of the argument, which is, as we
have seen, this argument’s real basis.
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 This argument takes as the only competing alternative the view that the representation of space could be
empirically acquired through outer intuition  (i.e., intuition of objects “… as distinct from the self and its states…”),
ruling out that the representation of space may be empirically acquired through inner intuition (i.e., experience of
“…the self and its states…”).  However, this claim has its Kantian basis, since, per the considerations of RI, outer
empirical representations are a condition of inner ‘empirical’ representations, and as such, even if we hypothesize
that the representation of space is empirically acquired through inner representations, its acquisition ipso facto
involves outer empirical representations.  As such, it cannot be empirically acquired through inner representations,
or outer empirical representations, if it is logically prior to outer empirical representations.   He defines empirical
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H.J. Paton raises a basic objection to the first apriority argument, one which has in
various formulations recurred in the philosophical literature (Allison (1983), 84).  Paton claims
that this argument is unsuccessful in demonstrating that space is logically prior to outer
appearances, since it fails to rule out the possibility that “…space…might stand to appearances
in a symmetrical relation, and appearances might be the condition of space…just as much as
space…[is] the [condition] of appearances.”63 (Paton, vol. 1 112)  It is this possibility, a
intuition as “… [that] intuition which is related to the object through sensation…” Now this definition alone is
ambiguous enough to permit that inner intuitions are empirical, since, strictly, they are related to their ‘object’
through sensation, albeit indirectly, i.e., through their dependence on outer intuitions, and ipso facto sensation.
Nevertheless, as Collins writes: “No other range of sensation [other than its range in outer sense] is given a footing
in Kant’s conception of our receptivity ...sensation…is no part of inner sense…” (Collins, 114).  Thus, “… [o]ur
access to the mind and its states is not perceptual access, and to that extent, the mind falls outside the empirical.”
(Collins, 124)  But even if we accept Collins’ point that the manifold of empirical intuition is strictly a manifold of
outer sense, and that this means that empirical cognition is necessarily of outer things, we cannot do so on the basis
that ‘sensation’ is a function of the so called, “special senses” (i.e., sight, smell, vision, hearing, touch), and that
these are essentially outer.  These are themselves part of the phenomenal world, and therefore “[s]uch professed
explanation…commits the…absurdity of attempting to account for the origin of the phenomenal world by means of
events which can exist only under the conditions which it itself supplies.” (Smith, 276)  Hence, while Collins is
correct to remark that “…sensation…is no part of inner sense…” – i.e., that our mode of receptivity is limited to
outer receptivity – and we may therefore, by the definition of empirical intuition, infer that empirical intuition, and
consequently our empirical cognition or perception, is essentially outer, which is to say that it is, on top of being in
temporal form, also necessarily in spatial form, we must also notice that ‘sensation’ is here properly understood as
having a transcendental signification rather than the everyday empirical one.  However, to speculate, we may also
keep in mind the ontological equivalency thesis, and that perhaps, unbeknownst to us, the empirical senses are
ontologically equivalent to our transcendental faculty of receptivity.
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 That is, the representation of space and outer intuition might be mutually conditioning, and as such the
representation of space is not logically prior to outer intuition, but rather they are logically concurrent, or
“dialectical”.  Thus, neither takes logical precedence: the representation of space has its source in outer intuition,
while at the same time outer intuition has its ground in the representation of space.  It seems that this objection gains
appeal when one considers Kant’s commitment to an initial receptivity that first breathes life, as it were, into the
formal faculties.  To use the breathing analogy, the former objection would see the relationship as a sort of circular
breathing, as if one were to breathe into the nose while at the same time blowing out through the mouth –  this is
something that is practiced by some musicians who play wind instruments, particularly those who play the
didgeridoo; taking in air conditions blowing the air out, while at the same time blowing the air out is a condition of
taking air in. – The operation of the representation of space it seems is therefore subsequent to, or concurrent with,
an initial material ground.  This seems to undercut its role as a formal epistemic condition of empirical intuition –
for receptivity must be possible without the working operation of the representation of space, or minimally,  the two
must only be possible concurrently – the representation of space itself only arising from this initial receptive
stimulation out of a “ ‘…first formal ground…’ ”, i.e., “…the mind’s peculiar capacity for acquiring sensations in
accordance with its subjective constitution…” (Smith, 91).  Consider Smith’s remarks:
“Throughout the Critique Kant insists that space is a form of receptivity.  It is given to the mind.
It has nothing to do with spontaneity or understanding, and therefore cannot be acquired by reflection upon
any activity of the mind.  But neither can it, as a priori, be acquired from without.  Consequently it cannot
be acquired at all.  But if given, and yet not acquired, it must as a representation lie ready in the mind from
the very birth of consciousness.  Constrained by such reasoning, Kant views it as given in all its
completeness just as truly as is a sensation of colour and sound.  This conclusion may not be satisfactory.
56
possibility that is, according to Paton, only negated through the considerations of the second
passage, which ultimately leads Paton to view the two passages as two parts of one argument
(Allison (1983), 85).
However, this line of objection is misconceived, and can only get off the ground by
neglecting that the representation of space is properly a precondition of outer sense.  Space is not
merely a presupposition of outer sense insofar as the supposition that it is a mere presupposition
permits it merely to be intrinsically bound up with the representation of outer things, so that
wherever there is the outer representation of things it merely follows necessarily that the
representation of space is also present.  Nor is it presuppositional in the sense that the
representation of outer things merely cannot be had apart from the representation of space.64
Rather, “…the representation of space functions within human experience as a means or vehicle
for the representation of objects as distinct from the self and from each other. [my emphasis]”
(Allison (1983), 85) It is this epistemological priority of the representation of space over outer
sense that secures its logical priority over outer empirical representation.65
Kant’s candid recognition of it is, however, greatly preferable to the blurring of the issue by most of his
commentators.” (Smith, 92)
However, it seems Kant has not so “candidly recognized” the conflict between the logical priority, or, for that
matter, the ontological independence, of the representation over receptivity with his other theoretical commitments.
While there is perhaps a way to resolve the aforementioned conflict consistently, and indeed much effort has been
devoted to this task, I am content, if pressed, to bite the bullet and concede that Kant was inconsistent on this point.
Out of the two commitments, i.e., the commitment to an initial receptivity that is logically prior to the functioning of
the formal faculties on the one hand, and the commitment to the logical priority of the representation of space over
receptivity on the other, the latter is demonstrated by TA, and is essential to Kant’s transcendental framework.  This
is so despite the fact that by scrapping the commitment to an initial receptivity, one must, reluctantly, dispense with
a rather appealing middle-ground between full-blown innatism and full-blown empiricism. – A hypothetical solution
to this conflict lies is postulating that Kant did not have receptivity per se in mind regarding the initial receptivity
considerations, but rather a proto-receptivity; something to which, ex hypothesi, the forms of sensibility do not
apply.  However, even if this conjecture results in a theoretically viable solution, there is much work still ahead to
find a textual basis for it.
64 Understood in this way, the representation of space could potentially stand in the type of symmetrical relation
with outer empirical representation, the two being mutually supportive.
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 This is why I have phrased the premises of the argument to read: the representation of space is logically prior to…
instead of: the representation of space is presupposed by… The former rules out the Paton objection and captures the
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To recapitulate, in this argument the apriority of the representation of space is
demonstrated on the basis of its logical priority over representing something as distinct from the
“…self and its states…”.  The empirical acquisition of the representation of space would, by its
empirical nature involve such representation.  But in what sense is the representation of space, as
this argument asserts, a means or vehicle for having these outer empirical representations?  Let
us note that there are numerous ways in which the representation of space’s apriority is
embedded within the possibility of outer empirical representations.  One way is that it makes
possible the employment of conceptual functions that are themselves logically prior to outer
empirical representation (see: B 288-94).  However, this priority with regard to conceptual
functions cannot alone demonstrate the apriority, or intuitional nature, of the representation of
space, since the demonstration that such conceptual functions are logically prior to outer
empirical representations – i.e., the necessity of these conceptual functions themselves – qua a
function of transcendental logic66, itself relies on “…the availability of pure intuition…” and
hence already presupposes the apriority, and intuitional nature, of the representation of space
(Warren, 197).  This would make the demonstration of the representation of space’s logical
priority over empirical intuition circular – i.e., its demonstration would depend on the necessity
real thrust of the representation of space’s epistemic role in sensible representation that is meant to be embodied by
the premises.
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 On the difference between general and transcendental logic, Kant writes:
“As has already been frequently said, general logic abstracts from all content of cognition, and
expects that representations will be given to it from elsewhere, wherever this may be, in order for it to
transform them into concepts analytically.  Transcendental logic, on the contrary, has a manifold of
sensibility that lies before it a priori, which the transcendental aesthetic has offered to it, in order to provide
the pure concepts of the understanding with a matter, without which they would be without any content,
thus completely empty.” (A 76-7/B 102)
The demonstrations cannot rely on considerations of the logical priority of a priori intuition over necessary
spatial/temporal conceptualization.  However, as Allison remarks, “…Kant does not deny the role of
conceptualization in the representation of space…” (Allison (1983), 92).  Even though the demonstration of the a
priori or intuitional nature of the representation of space cannot have as its basis the necessity of conceptual
representation in the above sense, it does not follow from this that conceptual representation cannot factor into the
proof of the a priori or intuitional nature of the representation of space.  Attention will be given to the issue of
conceptual involvement in the representation of space in the subsequent section: A Priori Intuition.
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of conceptual functions whose very necessity depends on its logical priority.  Rather, the
representation of space’s apriority is demonstrated by its logical priority, e.g., its, as this
argument asserts, “vehicular” role67, over mere outer empirical intuition, not instead by its
logical priority over conceptual functions (e.g., the re-identification of particulars over time, or
the employment of spatial concepts) which are inextricably bound up with robust outer empirical
representations per se – i.e., categorically informed empirical intuitions.   Thus, we must keep in
mind that the two arguments demonstrate that the representation of space is logically prior to
outer empirical intuition and ipso facto demonstrate its logical priority over outer empirical
representation in general.
However, nowhere do Kant or Allison, in their expositions of the first apriority argument
and immediately surrounding considerations, elaborate on the vehicular function of the
representation of space, which is, purportedly, the crux of the argument.  The question is not only
how this representation functions as a vehicle for outer empirical representation, but why, in the
case of human perception, this and no other device may serve this purpose.68  Perhaps the
representation of space’s vehicular role in outer empirical representation is explicable in terms of
67 We will examine how the representation of space may fill this role as a “pre-intuition” in the subsequent section
entitled: A priori Intuition.  However, this explanation cannot serve as the ground of the first, or second, apriority
argument(s), since it already presupposes the apriority of the representation of space.  Furthermore, even if we may
construct an independent argument, i.e., one that does not already presuppose the apriority of the representation, that
shows how the representation of space makes possible outer empirical representation, it is more difficult to devise a
cogent argument to the effect that the representation of space is the only device that can serve this function for us.
This is precisely what is required if we are to demonstrate its epistemic necessity.
68 Such explanation is vexed by the fact that it cannot arrive at the representation of space’s necessity as a vehicle of
our outer empirical representation through deducing the logical impossibility of it being otherwise.  Allison writes
that “… [Premise 1’s] significance stems precisely from the fact that no logical necessity is involved.” (Allison
(1983), 83)  Furthermore, “….[the fact that] it is not logically necessary for space to be the form of outer or time of
inner sense…enables us to recognize the (logical) possibility of other forms of sensible representation…More
important, Kant’s doctrine that we can think, although not know, things as they are in themselves requires him to
allow for this possibility.” (Allison (1983), 87)  Another parameter of such explanation is that it cannot arrive at the
aforementioned necessity of the representation of space through deriving the psychological impossibility of it being
otherwise.  If this were so, the argument would rest on, in Smith’s terms, a mere “brute fact” (Smith, 103).  Certainly
a psychological impossibility is not a sufficient ground to rest an epistemic necessity on, since, amongst else, it is
empirical, and is subject to Humean skepticism (for insight into the nature of epistemic necessity, see: footnote 14;
for definition of psychological and logical impossibility, see: footnote 74).
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its being an a priori intuition, but this certainly cannot serve as the ground of an argument that
attempts to establish the representation of space’s a priori status in the first place.  This is so
even if we may independently derive the apriority of this representation from the second
apriority argument.  If there is an argument that explicates the vehicular role of the representation
of space in terms that do not rely on its being an a priori intuition, this argument has not been
given.69  Perhaps we may find the materials of such an argument in the second argument for the
apriority of the representation of space, to which we now turn.
II)  Second Argument
The second argument for the apriority of the representation of space is given in the
following passage:
“Space is a necessary representation, a priori, which is the ground of all outer intuitions.  One can
never represent that there is no space, although one can very well think that there are no objects to be
encountered in it.  It is therefore to be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, not as a
determination dependent on them, and is an a priori representation that necessarily grounds outer
appearances.” (A 24/B 38-9)
This passage begins and ends with the conclusion of the argument; i.e., space is a necessary a
priori representation that grounds outer intuitions and appearances.70  The argument may be
formulated as follows:
69
 A similar weakness, as we shall see shortly, appears in the second apriority argument.
70
 Whether or not outer intuitions and appearances are meant to be taken as synonyms in this context is not
particularly important. Here we concern ourselves only with the role the representation of space plays as a necessary
ground of the intuitional component of outer empirical representation, and ipso facto empirical representation and
perception.  This is the same conclusion that is to be drawn from the first apriority argument.
Though this argument draws the same conclusion as the first apriority argument, it also, as we have
mentioned (recall: footnote 53), provides additional considerations which fill-in part of the story regarding the a
priori content of the representation of space (Allison (1983), 89).  In this way it goes beyond the first apriority
argument, i.e., it gives definition to the content (i.e., manifold) of the representation of space.
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Premise 1:  Outer empirical representation necessarily includes within its content
the content of the representation of space (i.e., extension, figure), and it is impossible to
eliminate this content from outer empirical representation without eliminating the outer
empirical representation all together.71
Premise 2:  The content of the representation of space does not necessarily
include within it the empirical content of outer empirical representation(s), and it is
possible to remove all empirical content (i.e., all “…other properties and relations
thought in connection with the representation of a body…” (Allison (1983), 89)) from the
content of the representation of space without eliminating the content of the
representation of space.72
Premise 3:  “…if x [e.g., the content of the representation of space] can be (or be
represented) without A, B, C and their mutual relations [e.g., the empirical content of an
outer empirical representation], but A, B, C cannot be (or be represented) without x, then
71 Allison remarks that this is an epistemic claim, not a psychological or logical one.  It is “… [not] Kant’s
point…that it is either psychologically or logically impossible to remove (in thought) space or time.  It is rather that
it is impossible to do so and still have any sensible content left to intuit.”  (Allison (1983), 87).  However, Allison
also remarks that “It does not, however, follow from the fact that we cannot think of appearances without also
thinking of them as in space and time, that these representations are a priori.” (Allison (1983), 87-8)  This is so,
since the claim fails to exclude the possibility that the representation of space is merely necessarily a part of the
representation of empirical things; that the two are, in intuition, merely necessarily conjoined (recall discussion of
Paton’s objection to first apriority argument (p. 55-6)).  Accordingly, the representation of space may be empirically
acquired.  Allison notes that “…[t]he problem can be expressed by noting that this claim, taken by itself, is perfectly
compatible with the Leibnizian doctrine that space and time are merely orders or systems of relations.” (Allison
(1983), 88)  However, if we are to understand Kant’s claim as an epistemic one, it is an epistemic claim that does
not embody the logical priority that has been frequently associated with such claims.  Now, we have discussed how
material transcendental conditions are a priori in terms of the possibility of full blown experience (itself a result of
synthesizing activities), yet qua material conditions they are not a priori in the weighty sense of being formal
conditions of all sensory affection.  There are, of course, epistemic conditions that are not a priori in the weighty
sense.
72
 Unlike premise 1, I see no reason why we should not treat this premise as a logical claim.  The logical function of
this premise in this argument, according to Allison, rests on its proving that the content of the representation of
space is “…logically independent, and thus irreducible to…” the empirical things in it (Allison (1983), 88). This, he
says, “…is the meaning of the claim that we can think space and time as empty of objects.” (Allison (1983), 88) At
first glance, this seems to already demonstrate the apriority of the content of the representation – for if extension is
not reducible to empirical content, then it would seem that it could not be acquired from it.  However, irreducibility
does not imply ontological independence (e.g., emergent phenomena).  Logical independence and irreducibility do
not strictly imply ontological independence.
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x must be viewed as a condition of the possibility of A, B, C and their mutual relations.”
(Allison (1983), 86)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion: -direct: The representation of space is logically prior to outer empirical
representation. -corollary: ∴ The representation of space is a priori.73
Premise 1 is, according to Allison, properly understood as an epistemic claim: one which
asserts the epistemic impossibility of removing extension and figure from outer empirical
representation – this is opposed to asserting a logical or psychological impossibility.74
Furthermore, we have seen that Allison conceives premise 1 as not by itself embodying the
logical priority of the representation of space, and this is precisely what must be if premise 2 and
3 are not moot. However, we may interpret premise 1 in this way without difficulty, since it is
quite natural to think that one cannot remove the content of the representation of space without
thereby removing an outer empirical representation all together; for this would follow if, as we
normally believe, extension and figure (qua ontological conditions) were merely inseparable
similar point regarding this claim’s compatibility with the Leibnizian view.  He writes:
“… [T]his claim, taken by itself, is perfectly compatible with the Leibnizian doctrine that space
and time are merely orders or systems of relations.  Every monad, after all, contains in its complete concept
something that corresponds to every other monad in the universe.  At the phenomenal level this is reflected
in the order or situation of things vis a vis one another. One cannot, in thought, negate this order without
also negating the very being of the things ordered.  Nevertheless, this hardly establishes that this order is a
73
 It is the content of the representation of space that is verbally implicated in the conclusion, though there is no
separating the content of the representation from the representation.
74
 Loosely, a logical impossibility is one that is constituted in x’s violating the principle of non-contradiction,
whereas a psychological impossibility is one that is constituted in the mere impossibility of x’s being represented via
our own psychological powers.  On the other hand, an epistemic impossibility is something that contradicts an
epistemic condition (see: footnote 14).
constituents of empirical things, and were themselves wholly empirical per se.  Allison makes a
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priori, that is, logically prior to and independent of the thought of the things ordered [my emphasis].”
(Allison (1983), 88)
Thus, the argument requires premise 2 and 3.  For premise 1 fails to rule out that, even if
empirical things or properties depend on extension and figure in order for them to be outer
things, or properties of outer things at all, the representation of space is, at the same time,
dependent on these empirical things or properties (recall Paton’s objection to the first apriority
argument).  It is only through introducing premise 2 that we may rule out this possibility.75
Once more, it is not the argument’s validity that seems questionable, but rather the
soundness of premise 1.  The general problem of explicating how the representation of space is
an epistemic condition of outer empirical intuition and why we should consider it a necessary
epistemic condition characterizes the apriority arguments.  The difference, as we have seen, is
that whereas premise 1 of the first apriority argument must be explicated in terms of being an
epistemic condition that embodies the logical priority of the representation of space over the
representation of something as distinct from the self and its states (i.e., in terms of its “vehicular”
function), premise 1 of the second argument must be explicated in epistemic terms that do not
embody this logical priority.  These considerations, coupled with the fact that both premises must
be explicated in terms of being epistemic conditions, as opposed to psychological or logical
conditions, make the complete explication of these premises, to say the least, quite constrained.
The epistemic function of the representation of space which is the crux of the second
apriority argument’s (AA2) first premise must be explained.  That is, we must give an account of
75
 To outline, the first premise establishes the epistemic necessity of the content of the representation of space with
regard to outer empirical representation.  The second premise proves that the content of the representation of space
is logically independent, and hence irreducible to, the empirical things found in it (Allison (1983), 88).  The third
premise combines the first and second premise into an argument for the logical priority of the representation of
space over outer empirical intuition.
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how the representation of space is a necessary part of outer empirical representation; why it
cannot be eliminated without thereby eliminating outer empirical representation all together.
However, it seems that we cannot rely on the first apriority argument (AA1) for this explanation.
For even if we could rest the explanation of the first premise of AA2 on premise 1 of AA1 in a
way that did not consequently transform the first premise of AA2 to embody the same logical
priority as premise 1 of AA176, we are still left with the task of explicating premise 1 of AA1.77
The analysis of the two apriority arguments has stimulated much discussion.  I have
attempted to describe Allison’s interpretation of these arguments accurately, and systematically.
However, I have also suggested potential shortcomings of his analysis, and of the arguments
themselves.  A general conclusion one may draw is that the two arguments provide a strong case
for the apriority of the representation of space (and, mutatis mutandis, the representation of
time), despite the fact that they have not been completely explicated in terms of the grounds of
their premises.  With the apriority arguments having been explained, let us now turn to the
equally important intuition argument.
76
 The explication of the first premises of AA1or AA2 must, of course, establish these premises in a way that does not
already assume the logical priority or apriority of the representation of space.  Furthermore, in the case of resting the
explication of premise 1 of either argument on premise 1 of the other argument, we are met with a potential problem
of transference.  Thus, if, for instance, the explication of the first premise of AA1 indeed rests on an explication of
some element or elements of AA2, the relevant explication of AA2 must rest on grounds, independent of the first
premise of AA1, that implicate the representation of space as logically prior to the representation of something as
distinct from the self and its states.  The alternative is that it is somehow possible to use an explanation that does not
implicate the logical priority of the representation of space to ground one that does.  Though it is conceivable that
one may trade-down, as it were, directly from an explanation that does embody logical priority to one that lacks this
element, as perhaps Allison does (see: footnote 77), the reverse is quite implausible.
77
 In his discussion of the first premise of AA2, Allison remarks that “…Kant is trying to make the…point…that we
cannot represent to ourselves outer appearances without representing them as in space.  Indeed, we saw in the
analysis of the first argument that it is precisely by representing appearances as spatial that we represent them as
“outer,” that is, as distinct from states of our consciousness.  Kant’s point, therefore, is not that it is either
psychologically or logically impossible to remove (in thought) space or time.  It is rather that it is impossible to do
so and still have any sensible content to intuit.” (Allison (1983), 87)  It seems that Allison relies on AA1 in order to
explain AA2 in the way outlined above.  However, he does not give any mention to the potential difficulty of doing
so regarding the transference of the logical priority embodied by the first premise of AA1 over to the first premise of
AA2.  Nor does he at this point give the much needed cogent explanation of the assertion of premise 1 of AA1.
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C)  The Intuitional Nature of the Representation of Space (and Time)
Kant provides two arguments for the intuitional nature of the representation of space.
The arguments are located in the section: “The Transcendental Aesthetic: First Section: On
Space—Metaphysical exposition of this concept” (A 22/B 37 – A 25/B 40).  For brevity’s sake, I
shall only address the first argument.  The first argument is given in the following passage:
“Space is not a discursive or, as is said, general concept of relations of things in general, but a pure
intuition.  For, first, one can only represent a single space, and if one speaks of many spaces, one
understands by that only parts of one and the same unique space.  And these parts cannot as it were precede
the single all-encompassing space as its components (from which its composition would be possible), but
rather are only thought in it.  It is essentially single; the manifold in it, thus the general concept of spaces in
general, rests merely on limitations.  From this it follows that in respect to it an a priori intuition (which is
not empirical) grounds all concepts of them.” (A 25/B 39)
The argument hinges on the exhaustiveness of two possibilities.  The first possibility is that the
representation of space is a concept, or “idea”.  The second possibility is that the representation
of space is an intuition.  Kant writes that“[i]ntuition and concepts…constitute the elements of all
our cognition…” (A 50/B74) There is, accordingly, no third alternative – the negation of the one
is the affirmation (proof) of the other, and this is the method by which we arrive at the
conclusion in this argument.  Since the argument involves a comparative analysis of the
representation of space as opposed to conceptual representation, brief explanation of the logical
structure of a concept is in order.
The structure of a concept is two-fold – it has an intensional structure, and an extensional
structure.  First, a concept’s extensional structure is, roughly, the domain of concepts which
subsume under it; it is coextensive with the domain of the objects to which the concept applies.
For instance, the concept ‘blue’ can be said to subsume under the concept ‘colour’, and any
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instance wherein blue applies, colour applies as well.  This relation is analogous to the relation
between genus and species (Allison (1983), 93).  In contrast, a concept’s intensional structure is
its component concepts, or “marks”.  For example, among the constituent concepts of the
concept ‘dog’ is the concept ‘mammal’, and this concept in turn has its intensional structure
(e.g., warm-blooded, animate), and so forth.  The intensional structures of the component
concepts of a given concept are part of the intensional structure of that given concept.
The argument compares the relation, in representation, between particular spaces or parts
of space and ‘space’ as a totality on the one hand, to the relation between a concept and its
intentional and extensional structure (Allison (1983), 90).  These considerations show that the
former reflects a kind of relationship that does not fit the structure of a concept.  Since the
structure of the representation of space does not fit the structure of a concept, it is not a concept,
and ipso facto is an intuition.  The argument may be formulated into two parts, corresponding to
its two comparative projects:
1) Extension considerations78
Premise 1:  We can only represent space as singular, or, equivalently, as a single
individual – the representation of space refers only to one thing (i.e., ‘space’).79
78  Norman Kemp Smith writes:  “The first part of the argument refers to the extension, the second part to the
intension of the space representation. [my emphasis]”  (Smith, 105)  Let us note that that which is being assessed
here is whether there is an extensional dimension to the representation of space that reflects the extensional nature of
a conceptual representation.  That there in fact is not an extensional dimension of the representation of space that
reflects the extensional nature of a concept is not to say that there is not an extensional aspect to the representation
of space, which is, after all, the assumption upon which the whole comparison depends.  For clarification, to
compare the extension of the representation of space to the extension of conceptual representation is to determine
the differences (or commonalities) in how, and what to which, they apply.  Conceptual representations can apply to
an indefinite number of individuals, whereas the representation of space can only apply to one particular thing (for
similar clarification regarding the intensional considerations, see: footnote 81).
79 Allison recognizes  that “…[i]f the argument is to work, it must be assumed that this is not a contingent matter, as
if the class of spaces just happened to have only one member.  But neither can it be a logically necessary truth…”
(Allison (1983), 90-1). We have encountered much the same issue in the first and second apriority arguments.
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Premise 2:  “Conception is always the representation of a class or genus.” (Smith, 107)
As such, a conceptual representation “…can have an …indefinite number of concepts
[and, mutatis mutandis, individuals] falling under it.80” (Allison (1983), 93)
2) Intension considerations81
Premise 3: i) The representation of a part of space is only possible or given through the
representation of limitations on “…the one all-encompassing space.82” (Smith, 105) ii)
The representation of the whole of space precedes the representation of its parts.83
80Distinguishing the two on this basis is insufficient.  Though a concept may have an indefinite number of objects to
which it applies, a class of concepts, namely general concepts, a subclass of which are ‘cosmological ideas’ (e.g.,
‘the universe’), must have a singularity of reference. – Cosmological ideas, e.g., ‘world’, refer to a class.  As such,
the concept refers to all worlds.  How then does this constitute a singularity of reference?  Its extension qualifies as
a singularity of reference, for instance, through its following connotation: ‘the world’, in which it is taken to connote
everything that is. – The fact that the representation of space must only refer to one thing does not rule out the
possibility that the representation of space is a concept.  Though concepts may have more than one object to which
they refer, they may also only refer to one object.  Even though the one and only object to which they apply is
composed of parts, we may not be referring to those parts in applying (extending) the concept (e.g., ‘the world’; ‘the
nation’).  As “…the concept of a complete collection or totality…” (Allison (1983), 91), the extension of the concept
‘world’ is a singular referent.   The extension considerations fail to sufficiently distinguish the representation of
space from conceptual representation.  However, they prepare the landscape of the second portion of the argument.
While, as we have seen, unity is not presupposed by singularity, singularity is nevertheless a mark of unity.
81
 Bringing the notion of intension, which up to now has been understood in terms of the intension of a concept, to
bear on the representation of space is initially perplexing.  However, there is a sense in which the same notion of
intension used with regard to concepts applies to the representation of space; and this can be understood in the
following way:  whereas the extension considerations involve comparing the scope of application of the
representation of space to the scope of application of a conceptual representation, the intensional considerations
involve comparing the representation of space to the representation of a concept.  Whereas we must conceive or
represent a concept as a composite, space, in contrast, must be conceived or represented as non-composite (i.e., a
unity). A potential ambiguity exists as to whether these considerations are merely meant to characterize the
representation of space, or whether they also characterize space itself.  The intension considerations assess how we
conceive or represent concepts, but the nature of concepts per se is likewise determined:  “A general concept is thus
a collection of marks.” (Allison (1983), 91)  However, it is unclear whether it is warranted or necessary to replicate
this two-pronged conclusion regarding the representation of space.  That is, can these considerations warrant the
conclusion that, regarding space itself, its whole always precedes its parts (i.e., it is a unity)? But the logical priority
the former has over the latter is a truth regarding a representation.  Whereas in the case of our representation of a
concept, the concept itself is determined, it is not clear that we may, from truths about the representation of space,
conclude truths about space per se in the same way.  This, however, is not necessary regarding the proof that the
representation of space is an intuition, since the representation considerations sufficiently distinguish it from
conceptual representation, in which the parts (in thought) precede the whole.  There is potential for slipperiness
regarding the former two distinct claims, and whether they are both implied by this or another formulation of the
first intuition argument is a live question. I believe Kant means to imply both claims by the argument. – Another
result of the limitation considerations is that we cannot represent boundaries on the whole of space, and therefore it
is not possible to represent that there are multiple distinct spaces, all of which are unities for themselves and not
instead parts of a space that encompasses them.  This would involve these unities having boundaries, limitations that
distinguish them from one another.
82
 As Allison notes, “…the introduction of limitations…is itself a conceptual activity…” (Allison (1983), 91).
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Premise 4: “In a concept the parts always [both in representation and its existence]
precede the whole.” (Smith, 105)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion: -direct: The representation of space is not a concept. -corollary: ∴ The
representation of space is an intuition.
D) A priori Intuition
Kant’s notion of a priori intuition has been the source of a host of interpretive and
theoretical qualms, and it is not hard to see why.  Barring the initial antagonism between the
conjoined terms84, there are several issues regarding a priori intuition that must be addressed on
the theoretical front.  Aside from the general objective of providing a more detailed account of
the nature and function of a priori intuition, most of this discussion will be restricted to Allison’s
analysis of one prevalent qualm regarding the conception’s coherence with some of Kant’s other
theoretical commitments.
The difficulty which I will discuss lies in an apparent antagonism between the conception
of a priori intuition and the theoretical commitments of the Transcendental Analytic (Allison
(1983), 94).  In particular, the tension arises from Kant’s insistence, expressed in the second
intuition argument, that “[s]pace is represented as a given infinite magnitude [my emphasis].85”
83
 This premise by itself is easily parlayed into an argument for the apriority thesis.  Smith takes notice of this, and
succinctly formulates this argument:  “That space is non-empirical would follow from the fact that representation of
space as a whole is necessary for the apprehension of any part of it.  [introduction of the premise] Empirical
intuition can only yield the apprehension of a limited space [my emphasis].  The apprehension of the comprehensive
space within which it falls must therefore be non-empirical…But in spite of its forcibleness this argument is
nowhere presented in the Critique.” (Smith, 106)
84
 See: footnote 53
85
 I have, due to both length constraints and the adequacy of the first intuition argument given this chapter’s
objective, abstained from analyzing the second intuition argument.  However, given the present context, it is
necessary to cite the argument.  Kant’s formulation of the argument in the B edition of the first Critique is as
follows:
“Space is represented as an infinite given magnitude.  Now one must, to be sure, think of every
concept as a representation that is contained in an infinite set of different possible representations (as their
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(B 39)  Allison points out that the tenets that space and time are given, and what’s more, are
given as infinite, seems problematic.  The former is complicated by the fact that, as we have
already seen86, for Kant “…pure space and time…are to be sure something, as the forms for
intuiting, but are not in themselves objects that are intuited (ens imaginarium).” (A 291/ B 347)
Allison writes:  “If they [i.e., space and time] are not given as objects of intuition, in what sense
can they be said to be given at all?”  (Allison (1983), 94)  On the other hand, the latter is
complicated by the fact that any apprehension of infinity presupposes conceptual determination,
and this, as we have mentioned87, is something that is logically posterior to a priori intuition.88
If such conceptual determination is inherent to a priori intuition itself, we run into contradiction
as to the very possibility of such determination.
In order to relieve these tensions, it is necessary to clarify some important distinctions
that our entire discussion has been fashioned to accord with, yet that have not, up to this point,
been made fully explicit.  Allison distinguishes the notion, form of intuition from the notion,
formal intuition (Allison (1983), 96).  The former “…can be taken to mean either the form or
manner (Art) of intuiting, which can be characterized as an innate capacity or disposition to intuit
things in a certain way…”, or it can be taken to signify “…the form, the essential structure, of
common mark), which thus contains these under itself; but no concept, as such, can be thought as if it
contained an infinite set of representations within itself.  Nevertheless space is so thought (for all the parts
of space, even to infinity, are simultaneous).  Therefore the original representation of space is an a priori
intuition, not a concept.” (B 39-40)
This argument is considerably “…more complex and more problematic than the [first intuition argument].” (Allison
(1983), 92)  One problem, which we will not discuss other than by briefly mentioning it here, is the apparent
contradiction between the second intuition argument’s characterization of space as represented as infinite and the
First Antinomy (contained in the Transcendental Dialectic), where Kant rejects the conception of an infinite world
in space and time (Allison (1983), 93).  This apparent contradiction, Allison maintains, is resolved by the fact that
Kant is employing a different sense of infinity with regard to the representation of space and time in TA than the
sense of infinity he is criticizing in the Transcendental Dialectic (Allison (1983), 93).
86
 See: footnote 53
87
 See: footnote 53
88
 The representation, i.e., a priori intuition, of the one all-inclusive space logically antedates conceptual
determination and the apprehension of determinate space.
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that which is intuited.” (Allison (1983), 97)  On the other hand, formal intuition signifies “…a
determinate intuitive representation of certain ‘formal’ or universal and necessary, features of
objects qua intuited…[which is]…a hybrid, requiring both the form of intuition and a concept by
means of which this form is determined in a certain way [i.e., judgment].” (Allison (1983), 97)
A formal intuition of space, then, is an objective representation of space. These distinctions are
undoubtedly deployed by Kant, albeit sometimes, as the present dilemma indicates, his shifts in
usage are less than clear.
The way to solve the present predicament is to neutralize the notion of givenness used to
characterize the representation of space.  As has been previously noted, it cannot be that the
original representation of space is given as an object.  Rather, determinate spaces are represented
through representing limitations on the one all-encompassing space, of which they are parts.
Thus, the representation of parts or a part of space through the conceptual activity of limitation is
a function of the representation of the whole of space.  Representing space qua object, or even
determinate space, depends on the “preconceptual” framework of the original representation of
space, which, consequently, can neither be a determinate or objective representation.  Allison
writes:
“First, through the introduction of limitations, which is itself a conceptual activity, we produce the
idea of determinate spaces (figures and magnitudes); then, on the basis of these determinations, we form by
abstraction the general concepts of spaces.” (Allison (1983), 91)
“… [T]he conceptualization of space, such as occurs in geometry, presupposes a preconceptual
framework (in Kant’s terms a ‘pure manifold’), which both guides and constrains our conceptual activity.
Since this framework guides and limits our conceptual activity (not only in geometry but also in ‘outer
experience’), it can be said to confront thought ‘from without’ as a brute, irreducible datum.” (Allison
(1983), 94-5)
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It follows that the indeterminate space, out of which determinate spaces are represented, is given
along with the representation of determinate spaces qua the form, i.e., the “original ground”, of
the intuited (Allison (1983), 95).  Furthermore, we are not given a representation of this
indeterminate space itself apart from the determinate representation of space of which it is a form
(Allison (1983), 95).
These considerations allow us to bypass the apparent difficulty of characterizing the
original representation of space as “given”.  They do so by characterizing the givenness of the
original representation of space in a way that distinguishes it from the conventional sense of
“givenness” that is associated with objective representation.89  However, they also serve to
dissolve the apparent difficulty of characterizing the representation of “indeterminate space” –
which is the content of the original representation of space – as a representation of space qua
“infinite given magnitude”.
Allison’s proposed solution may be formulated in the following way:  We may say that
the content of the original representation of space is characterized or represented, or even
apprehended as an “infinite given magnitude” through the representation or apprehension of the
form of determinate space.  The original representation of space is itself a representation, albeit
one that, as a preconceptual, or “preintuited” framework (Allison (1983), 95), cannot involve
within itself conceptual determinants.  However, it does not follow from this fact – i.e., the fact
89 Qua form of the intuited, the “vehicular role” of the original representation of space is easily understood.  As a
preintuited framework, the original representation of space functions not unlike a television format.  For a useful
though limited (and for that matter highly idiosyncratic) analogy, a television requires that the input material
conform to its format (e.g., NTSC, PAL).  In a sense, it is in virtue of this format that the television may display
material, for the format mode of the television permits some material to ‘pass through’ or be displayed.  Moreover, it
is possible to disconnect the input source from the television, and consequently view a black (or blue) screen; one
that is markedly different from the black screen seen when the television is turned off (one sees this when selecting
the video input channel (e.g., video 1, video 2) when no video device is connected).  The black screen may be
crudely conceived as a representation of the formal parameters of the television.  Similarly, if one could disconnect
the mind from material input, the form of outer sense would, per impossibile, be given as a brute spatial field.
Nevertheless, as has been noted, the true explication of the vehicular function of the representation of space cannot
rest on its being an a priori intuition.
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that conceptual determination cannot be inherent to the original representation of space – that the
space (or content) that is represented (contained) in this original representation cannot itself be
conceptually represented.  The indeterminate space of the original representation is represented
as an “infinite given magnitude” through representing the form of the representation of
determinate space.  This is possible, since the form, i.e., essential structure, of determinate space
is supplied via the original representation of space, and therefore characterizing the form of
determinate space is also a characterization of the indeterminate space of the original
representation.  This does not commit us to characterizing the original representation of space as
one that involves conceptual determination, even if it is true that representing the indeterminate
space of the original representation qua “infinite given magnitude” depends on its being
conceptually represented.90
E)  How A priori Intuitions are Possible
We have now come to the explication of Premise 2 of the direct proof of transcendental
idealism.  To recall, the premise states that “… an a priori intuition is possible, if and only if it
contains or presents to the mind a form of its own sensibility [my emphasis].” (Allison (1983),
105)  Accordingly, there are two assertions expressed by this premise, namely, that a priori
intuition is possible if it contains a form of the mind’s own sensibility, and that it is only possible
if this is the case.  Allison formulates these parts of the argument separately.  I will do so
accordingly.  The ‘if’ portion of the argument may be formulated as follows:
Premise 1:  If the content of an intuition is a form of intuited objects91 that
90
 What is inherent to the original representation of space, qua original ground of the intuited, is that which has been
stated in the first intuition argument; namely, the original representation of space supplies the, as it were, “…single,
all-inclusive space…” (Allison (1983), 96) out of which parts of space are determined through limitation.
91
 The formal features of an intuited object are those that determine its properties are organized “…or related to one
another in experience.” (Allison (1983), 106)  Keep in mind that under this minimal conception of formal features,
they may well be acquired empirically.  Under the Newtonian/Absolutist framework, spatial properties are, to be
sure, qua ontological conditions, ‘formal’ features of intuited objects in the above sense.
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is also a form of sensibility92, then it must be a priori.93
Premise 2:  The content of the original intuition of space is a form of intuited
objects.94
Premise 3:  The content of the original intuition of space is a priori.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusion:  The content of the original intuition of space is compatible
with it being a form of sensibility.
Now, the ‘if’ portion of the argument does not bear much of the justificatory workload.  What it
does do, however, is establish that a priori intuition is articulable as a form of sensibility (Allison
(1983), 107).  Let us now turn to the second portion of the argument.
The ‘only if’ portion of the argument is more complex; it is an argument from elimination
which takes as exhaustive three competing alternatives regarding the metaphysical status of
space and time and their associated epistemic possibilities regarding the origination of the
representation of space.95  The three competing alternatives are: a) the Newtonian/Absolutistic
view, b) the Leibnizian/Relationalist view, and c) the Transcendental Idealist/Kantian view that
space is a form of sensibility (Allison (1983), 107).96  The task is to show that all but the view
that space is a form of sensibility is incoherent with the fact that space is an a priori intuition.  I
92 ‘Form of sensibility’ is to be taken in one of its two senses.  Namely, it is to be taken as “…a form of objects qua
sensibly intuited.” (Allison (1983), 107)  However, if something is a “form of objects qua sensibly intuited”, then it
is a result of the subject’s “form of receptivity” – the latter is the second sense of “form of sensibility; i.e., “…a form
of sensibly intuiting, which Kant also terms a ‘form of receptivity’ ” (Allison (1983), 107).  Hence, both senses
“…carry with them mentalistic implications.” (Allison (1983), 107)
93
 This point has been sufficiently worked over in preceding discussion.
94
 For elucidation of Premise 2 and Premise 3, see the analysis of the apriority arguments (p. 51-63).
95
 Due to the complexity and lengthiness of this argument, I have chosen to break with the custom of putting the
argument in an explicit logical form.
96
 Allison maintains that the criticisms waged in this argument against the Newtonian/Absolutist and
Leibnizian/Relationalist views of space and time may be construed so as to ensnare all Absolutist and Relationalist
views, respectively (Allison (1983), 107).
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will now reexamine why the epistemic function and logical place the representation of space has
qua a priori intuition is inconsistent with the Relationalist view.
The Relationalist view of space, minimally, takes space to be nothing more than a system
of relations regarding a community of co-existing things.  Space, then, is itself not a separately
existing entity, but something whose existence is predicated on co-existing things and their
mutual relations.  The epistemology of the representation of space, per the Relationalist view,
reflects this logical relationship.  The apprehension of co-existing phenomena must be prior to,
or perhaps even concurrent with, the apprehension or idea of space itself.  Now, the apriority
arguments assert that the original representation of space must be possible absolutely prior to, or
without, the apprehension of outer things, let alone the apprehension of coexisting phenomena.
Thus, minimally, Relationalist theories of space, insofar as they are constrained to the previous
epistemological view, are inconsistent with the representation of space being a priori.  Since it
has already been proved that the representation of space is an a priori intuition, the Relationalist
view of space cannot be true.
It is a further question whether the intuition arguments provide additional grounds to
reject the Relationalist view.  Since the apriority arguments are sufficient for our purposes, it is
not necessary to go into this matter in much detail.  However, notwithstanding the question of
whether the Relationalist is forced to conceive of the representation of space as a concept or idea,
or even, as Kant writes, “… [a] creature…of the imagination…” (A 40), it seems that the claim
of the first intuition argument that we cannot represent the parts of space prior to representing
space as a whole conflicts with the Relationalist view that the representation of space originates
from the apprehension of co-existing phenomena.  This is so, since it seems all that could
possibly be given or follow from the apprehension of co-existing phenomena, qua an
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apprehension of a sub-set of particulars, is the representation of parts of space (i.e., the system of
relations of those particulars).  With the Relationalist view of space being eliminated, all that is
left now is to rule out the Absolutist view of space, to which we now turn.
For present purposes, it suffices to define the Absolutist view in the following way: the
conception of Absolute space, minimally, consists of characterizing space as something that is,
whether in itself – i.e., apart from being a property of objects – or qua spatial property,
transcendentally real.  Furthermore, space is conceived as not logically dependent on the
relations of things, but rather is the ontological condition of such things and relations.  Under this
view, space is frequently characterized as a ‘container-like’ thing, which surrounds and saturates
all that exists.  Kant, rather glibly, casts the Absolutist view of space and time as one that
“…must assume two eternal and infinite self-subsisting non-entities (space and time), which
exist (yet without there being any-thing real) only in order to comprehend everything real within
themselves.” (A 39-40)
Now, the relevant question is whether or not there is an epistemic view regarding the
origination of the representation of space that coheres with the Absolutist view of space and also
with the fact that the representation of space is an a priori intuition.  Since the possibility that the
representation of space is a form of sensibility is ruled out ex hypothesi – and, for that matter, we
have already demonstrated the incoherence of the neglected alternative objection97, which is all
this possibility in connection with the Absolutist view amounts to – there are three possibilities.
Allison puts these possibilities as follows:
“(1) We have an innate idea of space, and between this idea and space itself there exists a kind of
‘preestablished harmony’98; (2) Our idea of space is derived from the experience of these ‘real things’ [i.e.,
97
 See the discussion of this objection in: chapter 1; C).
98
 This option is not strictly a variation of the transcendentally real forms of intuition objection, since an innate idea,
which ex hypothesi provides the epistemic function of the representation of space, is not, at least in the conventional
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space or spatial properties] and represents a property and condition of them…[; (3)] [W]e have a direct
acquaintance with space itself, and…this enables it to serve as a ‘condition’ of experience in the sense that
it provides a fixed framework with respect to which we can orient ourselves and distinguish between the
real and apparent (relative and absolute) motion of bodies.” (Allison (1983), 110)
Option (2) and (3) are what I have coined the weak and strong formulations of the
transcendentally real forms of intuition objection, respectively.
To recall, the first apriority argument rules out the possibility of empirically acquiring
the representation of space.  It does so by demonstrating the logical priority the representation
has over empirical intuition.  Option (2) is therefore inconsistent with the logical priority of the
representation of space, and suffers from the blatant contradiction of postulating that the
precondition is acquired from the thing whose possibility it preconditions.  This option has been
sufficiently worked over elsewhere in the discussion, and it may be laid to rest here.99  I will now
examine the plausibility of option (1).
sense, transcendentally real.  That which is transcendentally real in this case, namely Absolute space, is not itself the
form of intuition, and has no formal epistemic function.
99
 However, Guyer, in, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge, mounts a rather pointed criticism of Allison’s
formulation of the fundamental principle of transcendental idealism.  To recall, this principle states that “…by
assuming that the representation of space is somehow derived from our experience of things as they are in
themselves, this formulation denies the possibility that space can function as a condition of the possibility of the
experience of things…[T]here is a contradiction involved in the assumption that the representation of something that
is supposed to function as a condition of the possibility of the experience of objects can have its source in the
experience of these objects.  This is contradictory because it entails that experience be possible apart from
something that is stipulated to be a condition of its possibility.”  (Allison (1983), 110)
In retort, Guyer writes:
“Most generally, any such argument obviously begs the question of transcendental idealism by
assuming from the outset that any necessary condition of knowledge is subjective rather than
objective…More specifically, Allison’s description of the contradiction that allegedly arises from the denial
of this principle is itself incoherent.  He says…that rejecting the principle that epistemic conditions reflect
the structure of the mind rather than of the object leads to the incoherent supposition that the mind can
somehow have access to objects which do not conform to the necessary condition of the mind’s access to
objects.  In fact, it is only the acceptance of this principle, not its rejection, which leads to the idea that
there are objects which lack the structures which are the necessary condition of our access to objects.  The
contradiction lies in using the principle to deny spatiality to objects but continuing to assume that we have
access to such objects even when spatiality is a necessary condition of our knowledge.”  (Guyer, 339)
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Option (1) does not hold much water.100 This proposed parallelism, as it were, evades the
problem only by removing the objective necessity of the epistemic function the representation of
space has been endowed with in the first place.  Since in this case the necessity the representation
of space has would not be issued from the possibility of outer empirical representation per se, but
would rather be based on a mere brute psychological fact (necessity) regarding the mind – i.e.,
that the mind is constituted in such a way that its not possessing and conforming to the
representation of space is impossible – this option is unable to account for the objective necessity
of the representation of space.  Thus, this option stands only insofar as it evades accounting for
While Guyer is quite right to point out that this principle appears to suppose ab initio that formal epistemic
conditions are subjective conditions, the proper formulation of the principle supposes that such epistemic conditions
hold a position of logical priority over experience/intuition.  This fact alone is not equivalent to the fact that such
conditions are subjective, though in the case of formal conditions it certainly entails it.  For instance it is quite right
to infer from the logical priority of the representation of space over empirical intuition that it cannot be acquired
from empirical intuition, and, consequently, that it is a function of the mind. – In the case of material conditions,
they are not logically prior to empirical intuition, for their possibility is predicated on the possibility of empirical
intuition; they are rather logically prior to experience.  The categories, on the other had, as we have seen, are
logically prior to judgment.  Thus, since any empirical acquisition of them would necessarily include judgment, they
cannot be acquired empirically. – Furthermore, the contradiction does not arise from the view that we may intuit
non-spatial objects even when the representation of space is a condition of their being intuited (though this would
surely be a contradiction).  Rather, the contradiction arises from considering the representation of space to be
logically prior to the intuition of objects, and at the same time maintaining that this representation is acquired from
such intuitions.  This is irrespective of whether or not such objects are spatial in themselves.  For even if, ex
hypothesi, such objects were spatial in themselves, if the representation of space were logically prior to empirical
intuition, we could not intuit such objects if the representation of space is principally acquired via intuition of them.
However, if this principle is not to, as Guyer maintains it does, suppose ab initio that formal epistemic conditions
are subjective conditions, then the justification for the logical priority of the representation of space in terms of its,
thus far occult, “vehicular function” with regard to empirical intuition must not be predicated on considerations of
the constitution of the senses.
100 Consider the following remarks Kant makes regarding this option in relation to the categories, where Kant terms
this option a preformation-system:
“If someone still wanted to propose…that the categories were neither self-thought a priori first
principles of our cognition nor drawn from experience, but were rather subjective predispositions for
thinking, implanted in us along with our existence by our author in such a way that their use would agree
exactly with the laws of nature along which experience runs (a kind of preformation-system of pure
reason), then (besides the fact that on such a hypothesis no end can be seen to how far one might drive the
presupposition of predetermined predispositions for future judgments) this would be decisive against…[this
option]:  that in such a case the categories would lack the necessity that is essential to their concept.  For,
e.g., the concept of cause, which asserts the necessity of a consequent under a presupposed condition,
would be false if it rested only on a subjective necessity, arbitrarily implanted in us, of combining certain
empirical representations according to such a rule of relation.  I would not be able to say that the effect is
combined with the cause in the object (i.e., necessarily), but only that I am so constituted that I cannot think
of this representation otherwise than as so connected…” (B 167-8)
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what has been initially proposed; and hence, it does not stand at all.  Finally, let us turn our
attention to option (3).
Like option (2), option (3) is irreconcilable with the logical priority that the
representation of space has been demonstrated to have over outer empirical intuition.  However,
even if we ignore this, it suffers from a further defect.  The direct acquaintance with the
indeterminate space which has been implicated as a precondition of the awareness of determinate
space, or in Absolutist terms, the direct perceptual acquaintance with space in itself that has been
presupposed by the perception of real and apparent motion, presupposes that this space is itself
an object.  This, however, is explicitly denied both by Kant and Newton (Allison (1983), 110).
Granted that, ex hypothesi, as a mere form of the intuited, spatial features may well be
transcendentally real101, the epistemic role that Kant assigns the representation of space asserts
that a pre-intuition of an original or independent representation of space must be possible prior to
intuiting other objects, and thus intuiting space in the form of intuited objects.   This, however,
under the absolutist view is not possible because space apart from objects cannot be objectively
perceived or rather perceived at all.  It is, as it were, a self-subsistent non-entity.
Out of the three alternatives, namely: a) the Newtonian/Absolutistic view, b) the
Leibnizian/Relationalist view, and c) the Transcendental Idealist/Kantian view that space is a
form of sensibility, it has been demonstrated that a) and b) and their associated epistemic regimes
are inconsistent with, or unable to account for, Kant’s conception of the representation of space
qua a priori intuition.  Since, these three metaphysical alternatives are exhaustive and mutually
exclusive, the negation of two of them is an affirmation of the third.  Thus, the soundness of
Premise 2 of the direct proof of transcendental idealism has been demonstrated.  This, coupled
with the preceding demonstration of the soundness of Premise 1 of the argument, and the
101
 See discussion on p. 11-2.
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argument’s logical validity, demonstrates that space is a form of sensibility, and, given the
analysis of the neglected alternative objection in chapter one, is ipso facto transcendentally ideal.
In this chapter I have discussed in detail what Allison conceives as the direct argument
for the transcendental ideality of space and time given in TA.  In so doing, I have expounded the
sub-arguments for the claims made in the premises of this argument – namely, ‘the apriority
arguments’, ‘the intuition arguments’ (the first of the two), and the ‘how a priori intuitions are
possible argument’ – and have found these arguments to be quite compelling, despite that I have
identified one weakness worth mentioning regarding the apriority arguments: namely, premise 1
of each of the apriority arguments lacks a cogent explanation for why it should be accepted.
With the argument for the transcendental ideality of space and time in place, let us return to the
question of the inter-theoretical relationship of TI and direct realism, and provide more detailed
grounds to consider the two as mutually compatible.
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CHAPTER 3
FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON THE INTER-THEORETICAL RELATIONSHIP OF
TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM AND DIRECT REALISM
A) Surrounding Considerations
I) The Scope of Investigation
A grounding of the anti-phenomenal idealist interpretation of the Critique, taken as the
edifice of a coherent metaphysical system, would minimally demonstrate TI’s and direct
realism’s inter-theoretical neutrality in connection with each other, and the Critique as a
whole.102  Discussion has been limited to the lesser task of grounding the theoretical neutrality of
TI with direct realism per se.  The exegesis of the ‘Refutation of Idealism’, then – which, by
illustration of the coherent employment of direct realism within the Critique, coupled with TI’s
respective theoretical neutrality, would generate the supreme ground of an anti-phenomenal
idealist interpretation – is beyond the present scope of this thesis.
Rather, I have confined my investigations to a portion of the ultimate ground of the anti-
phenomenal idealist interpretation of the Critique; namely, an argument for at least the inter-
theoretical neutrality of TI in relation to direct realism. Analysis stops short of the ‘Refutation of
Idealism’, the complete analysis of which, in all its complexity, involves assessing the validity
and soundness of the argument, and its premises’ own theoretical kinships with the rest of the
Critique.
102  I do not advertently address the question of whether or not, despite the fact that, as Guyer writes, “…the
refutation does not employ transcendental idealist premises…” (Guyer, 282), TI itself entails direct realism.  Instead,
I suppose, for the sake of argument, that TI does not itself entail direct realism.  This supposition is perhaps credible
given the abundance of phenomenal idealist interpretations of the Critique.
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II) How the Ontological Equivalency Thesis Makes Direct Realism Possible
To recall, the ontological non-equivalency thesis is the view that Kant’s appearance/thing
in itself distinction is an ontological one; i.e., the objects of appearance are numerically distinct
from things in themselves. 103 One way to arrive at this result within the transcendental
framework is to postulate that objects of experience are ontologically dependent on their formal
organization. Transcendental (formal) idealism asserts that the formal structures of objects of
experience are mind-dependent, and that such structures cannot, eis ipsis, pertain to things in
themselves.  Thus, if it is the case that perceptual objects are ontologically dependent on their
formal organization, it follows that they are themselves, in the transcendental sense, mind-
dependent. Bearing in mind the tenets of direct realism, i.e., that we are in immediate perceptual
contact with physical, mind-independent objects, ONET undermines the possibility of direct
realism insofar as it postulates that the objects of perception are, at the most fundamental level,
mind-dependent entities.
However, there is perhaps room to quibble on this point.  One may object that direct
realism does not require that objects of perception are transcendentally mind-independent, but
only that they are empirically mind-independent.  That is, perhaps it is sufficient for objects of
perception to merely exist outside of our episodic perceptions of them for the ‘realism’ of direct
realism to be maintained.  However, the direct realist does not assert a relative or ‘weak’ mind-
independence regarding objects of perception.  Rather, objects of perception must be absolutely
mind-independent entities. For the sake of argument, let us assume that direct realism commits
103
  We may be persuaded to this view directly from the Cartesian prejudices that one may carry into one’s reading
of the Critique.  But perhaps the mere mind-dependent nature of space and time per TI should itself cause one to
pause over the question of the ontology of objects in space and time.  Initially, one is left wondering which
ontological status prevails when mind-dependent structures are imposed on or combined with mind-independent
things.
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us to this sort of ontological or absolute realism. If this is the case, any thorough direct realist
reading of Kant’s doctrine of perception cannot accept the two-world standpoint, if the view is
that objects of perception are, even if only in the transcendental sense, mind-dependent realities.
In contrast, OET is predicated on interpreting the transcendental appearance/thing in itself
dichotomy as encapsulating two ways in which the same object(s) may be conceived, in
transcendental reflection.  Accordingly, ‘transcendental reflection’ refers to both a consideration
of the object as subject to the formal parameters of possible experience (i.e., as appearance), as
well as a consideration of the very same object apart from this relation (i.e., as thing in itself).104
Thus, while there is a discrepancy between the two considerations of one and the same object, it
is one and the same object being considered in each case.105   Nevertheless, according to this
view we can know the objects of perception as appearances, but cannot know them as things in
themselves.  From our standpoint as creatures of sensibility, objects as they are in themselves are
wholly indeterminate –despite that their concept includes what we may conceive of them
analytically through the constraints we impose on their ‘appearance’.  Things in themselves are
not principally unknowable because they are ontologically different from the objects which the
epistemological subject may encounter.  Rather, insofar as we have a priori filters which are
104 The emphasis on ‘a consideration of’ is meant to underscore the significance of the adverbial formulation of the
distinction that, according to Allison, allows us to avoid contradiction (see: Allison (1983), 240-1).  Such matters are
attended to in footnote 105.
105
 I see no reason to concede that there is any contradiction in attributing to the object the double status of
appearance and thing in itself.  This property-dualism, as it were, is coherent if the ‘appearance’ status of the object
is a relational property, which it is.  Accordingly, the object is an appearance in relation to the formal parameters of
experience, and is a thing in itself outside of this relation; albeit, in either case, it is one and the same object.
Allison’s reading of the OET interpretation and the appearance/thing in itself distinction is different from this.
Where some attribute to the object the dual status of appearance and thing and itself, he believes this leads to the
contradiction of one and the same object being both an appearance as well as a thing in itself.  His adverbial
formulation of the distinction remedies this problem by relegating the contradicting terms to the domain of
consideration, or ideas.  Allison writes that “…the relevant terms function adverbially to characterize how we
consider things in transcendental reflection, not substantivally to characterize what it is that is being considered or
reflected upon [i.e., objects].”  (Allison (1983), 241)  As such, the opposing descriptions of the object do not inhere
in the object, but are merely factors within our transcendental conception of the object.  I am, however, sympathetic
to a more realist view regarding the appearance/thing in itself distinction (see: footnote 106).
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imposed on objects of perception on behalf of our subjective constitutions, we have a threshold
of knowledge.  The concept ‘thing in itself’, ex hypothesi, refers to the objects when taken
outside of this threshold.
The proponents of the OET interpretation assert that this interpretation is textually well
supported.106 Collins writes:
“Following the findings of Gerold Prauss, I will say that the concept of the ‘thing-in-itself’ and of
the contrasting appearances is never presented as an ontological distinction by Kant.  Kant usually includes
some version of the longer epithet ‘things considered as they are in themselves,’ versus ‘things considered
as they appear to us,’ and when he does not, this idea is implied, or the short ‘thing-in-itself’ terminology is
intended as an abbreviation.”  (Collins, 58)
The OET interpretation upholds TI in that the spatial and temporal organization of objects
of experience is dependent on the mind’s mode of cognition. However, the notion that the outer
objects of appearances, or rather the objects that ‘appear’ in spatiotemporal form, are themselves
mind-dependent, is not included within the OET interpretation of TI. Rather, while their
spatiotemporal organization is mind-dependent, such objects are, according to OET, mind-
106
 There are, to be sure, issues regarding this interpretation.  As we have seen, an initial worry is that OET commits
us to the view that one and the same object is both an appearance, and a non-appearance (i.e., a thing in itself), and
therefore leads to contradiction (see:  Allison (1983), 240-1).  A full explanation of these issues is, due largely to
length constraints, beyond the scope of this paper.  Moreover, our present concern is, minimally, to establish that
OET is important for transcendental idealism to be consistent with direct realism.   Explicating the complete
coherent picture of OET is a further, more intricate matter.  Nevertheless, the worry that under OET one must hold
the contradictory view that a single object is both spatial/temporal and non-spatial/temporal, or, an appearance and
thing in itself, can perhaps be dealt with straightforwardly: there is no contradiction in asserting that an object is
spatiotemporal, or an appearance, in relation to the human subject, and that this relation is itself necessary for such
predicates to apply to it.  The contradiction only arises if the object contains opposing attributes.  However, is it not
intelligible that one object may be given different simultaneous descriptions from two different standpoints?
Objects are appearances through our transcendentally ideal lens; the same objects are things in themselves apart
from this lens.  The contradiction Allison sees in this is perhaps merely verbal.  It seems to me that the coloured
spectacles analogy provides one tangible scenario or model by which to understand OET’s coherence.  Accordingly,
the status of ‘appearance’ does not strictly inhere in the objects, but in a logical relation such objects have with the
mind.  Contradicting properties, then, are not inherent to the object.  Rather, the properties of the thing in itself are
intrinsic to the object, and the properties of the appearance of the object are relational.
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independent realities.  It is merely the case that we are acquainted with mind-independent reality
through the mind-dependent forms of space and time – appearances and things in themselves are
not ontologically distinct objects.  At the same time, however, we are not perceptually
acquainted with things as they are in themselves, or, as it were, things in themselves qua things
in themselves.  This would, by definition, require that we could perceive the objects of
perception apart from the subjective forms of perception.
Now, the OET interpretation is compatible with the ontological commitments of direct
realism.  Given that the objects of perception are ontologically equivalent to things in
themselves, they are absolutely mind-independent. Moreover, they are also ‘physical’ entities,
even though their ‘physicality’, i.e., their spatial/temporal form, is transcendentally mind-
dependent. However, this is no shortcoming, as direct realism merely requires that we are in
immediate perceptual contact with physical, mind-independent objects.
The ontological tenet of direct realism could be restated to emphasize that the objects that
are mind-independent are spatiotemporal objects. Thus, let it be that direct realism posits that
we are immediately acquainted with mind-independent spatiotemporal objects.  This formulation
is neutral on the question of the mind independency of the spatiotemporality of objects.
Spatiotemporal objects, under the OET interpretation, are, in fact, mind-independent realities.  A
problem only arises if direct realism is committed to the view that the spatiotemporality of
objects of perception is itself absolutely (transcendentally) mind-independent. This cannot be
upheld under transcendental idealism. However, I see no reason why the direct realist must
commit himself to this view, though how queer it is to affirm the mind-independency of
spatiotemporal objects, but deny the mind-independency of the spatiotemporality of objects.
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To reiterate, while the OET interpretation of TI permits the absolute mind-independency
of spatiotemporal objects, the mind-independency of the spatiotemporality of such objects is
another matter. Rather, although spatial and temporal properties of objects are empirically real,
they are transcendentally mind-dependent.  In other words, spatial and temporal properties of
objects exist insofar as such objects are ‘appearances’.  It follows that even though
spatiotemporal objects are, according to OET, transcendentally mind-independent, we cannot
express this mind-independency in terms of such objects possessing the quality of persistence.
That is, even though absolutely apart from minds the objects of outer appearance qua things in
themselves exist, they are also, qua things in themselves, non-spatiotemporal entities.  This is an
unavoidable result of the interpretation of transcendental idealism offered here. Thus, while
OET satisfies the mind-independency condition of direct realism, more is left to be desired;
namely, an explanation of how spatial objects persist107.
III) The Transcendental and Empirical Senses of ‘Appearance’ and ‘Thing in Itself’; the
Appearance in Itself
a)  General Remarks
Insofar as Kant’s transcendental framework contains the fabric of direct realism, it is
consonant with the naïve realist worldview.  Among else, this worldview affirms that spatial
objects persist outside of our respective perceptual episodes of them – i.e., outer objects retain
the character we perceive them to have irrespective of their being perceived.  This view is
something that may rightly be gleaned from the naïve realist worldview, given its brute
commitment to a world of ‘self-subsistent’ spatiotemporal objects.  However, it is not the case
that direct realism need conform to the view that spatial objects persist independently of the
107 RI, purportedly, demonstrates that we immediately perceive enduring physical objects; if this hypothesis is to be
intellectually penetrable, the persistence of spatial objects outside of perceptual episodes must be intelligible.
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mind in the transcendental sense, since it is not natural for the qualifications that are necessary to
determine a transcendental signification of this sort to arise in the common sense worldview of
naïve realism – such qualifications necessary to definitively mark out transcendental
significations of this sort are moot in the discourse of common sense.108
The thesis that objects of perception are subsistent in the transcendental sense, or are
spatial and temporal in the transcendental sense, cannot be extrapolated from naïve realism, and
if it is associated at all with this worldview, it is imposed on it from without.  Since it is
reasonable not to impose any theoretical constraints on a direct realist account other than those
that are necessary for the account to theoretically legitimate naïve realism, and provided that
naive realism is neutral on whether the objects of perception are spatial and temporal in
themselves, there is no reason why such a view needs to be smuggled into direct realism.
108
 Consider the following propositions:
1) “There is an absolutely (i.e., transcendentally) mind-independent world of spatiotemporal objects” – This
view is coherent given the OET interpretation of TI.
2) “There is a world of spatiotemporal objects, the persistence of which is absolutely (i.e., transcendentally)
mind-independent.” – This view is incoherent given TI.
3) “There is a world of spatiotemporal objects that is, qua spatiotemporal, absolutely (i.e., transcendentally)
mind-independent.” – This view is incoherent given TI.
I consider claim 2 and 3 not to naturally arise in the discourse of common sense, since such qualified statements (the
relevant qualifications are italicized) are not moot only if one has a transcendental distinction in mind.  Since naïve
realism is only committed to common sense views, and given that claim 2 and 3 do not naturally arise in the
common sense view, naïve realism cannot be committed to view 2 or 3.  For the sake of argument, let’s attempt to
formulate these views in common sense terms.  Take the following as potential  reflections in common sense
discourse of 2 and 3:
a)     “The world existed before minds existed.”
b)     “The spatiotemporal world will continue to exist after minds cease to exist.”
If these claims were taken in the transcendental sense, they would be inconsistent with TI, since for one, according
to TI, there is no ‘before’ or ‘after’, which are markedly temporal determinations, independently of minds.  Now, the
naïve realist would certainly assert a and b.  However, these claims are only incoherent under TI if they have a
definitively transcendental signification; for it is entirely consistent with TI that these claims are empirically true;
and they are coherent statements, under TI, if they have an entirely empirical signification.  Certainly the appearance
of the spatiotemporal world existing before and after the existence of minds is connected-up with our immediate
perception through transcendental (e.g., the causal principle) and empirical laws, and is, therefore, a sound empirical
assertion.  Thus, I put forward the following hypothesis: whereas we may conceive of claim 1 as naturally
occurring, either in this or another formulation, in the domain of common sense, the same may not be said of claim
2 or 3.  This is so, because the qualifications which would mark out their transcendental significance are themselves
not naturally occurring in common sense, and as such, any common sense proposition put forward as a candidate of
having this sort of transcendental significance is interpretable as having an entirely empirical significance, and is
therefore consistent with TI.
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The persistence of remote objects, or objects that are not, at any given moment, the
contents of our transient perceptual episodes, is not explicable, given transcendental idealism, in
terms of the persistence of those objects considered as things in themselves. However, it is also
the case that direct realism, conceived as the theoretical legitimation of naïve realism, must be
consistent with the persistence of spatial objects. TI must minimally permit that the spatiality of
objects is not transitory, unlike our perceptions of spatial objects are, if it is compatible with
naïve realism.
I have attempted to distance TI from the view that the formal organization of an object
only pertains to it in virtue of its (the object) being the content of a perceptual episode109, and
this distance is necessary in order to uphold the persistence of spatial objects in the above sense.
However, aspects of the discussion seem to pull us in the other direction: the very notion that
space and time are forms of sensibility, and that they are therefore in some sense dependent on
sensibility, seems to suggest that it is only in virtue of a thing’s inclusion in sensible receptivity –
as the material contents of a sensory episode – that it acquires its spatiotemporal character.
Regrettably, the coloured spectacles analogy, taken in its most literal sense, is suggestive of this
view. The colour that objects appear to have is a function of the spectacles in action – i.e., the
colour ascription extends no further than visual episodes.
The question is whether there are any grounds for asserting that the spatiotemporal form
of an object extends beyond such object’s inclusion within actual sensory episodes.  This we
must answer in the affirmative.  For, as Paton writes, “[Kant’s] whole doctrine of substances is
meaningless unless this is true.  For Kant, the actual or existent is not what is immediately
present to sensation, but what is connected with sensation in accordance with the Analogies.”
(Paton, vol. 1, pp. 61). We have observed this in our previous discussion on the difference
109
 See: chapter 1; D), II).
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between TI and empirical idealism. 110 Allen Wood writes that interpreting TI as a doctrine
which makes outer objects into transient entities ontologically dependent on their immediate
perceptions “…is a non-starter because it is incompatible with Kant’s basic doctrines regarding
the category of reality or existence.  Kant insists that that category applies, regarding the world
of appearance, not only to what is directly given in perception but also to what is connected to or
what can be inferred from what is given according to transcendental and empirical laws.”
(Wood, 6)
Kant conceived the forms of experience to pertain to outer objects qua appearance through the
Analogies; through the necessary causal, substantival, or communal connections these objects
have with both the inner and outer objects given within sensory episodes.111  The mind, as it
were, permeates the world beyond what is given in transient sensory episodes, even if such
episodes are a condition of the mind’s logical extension beyond them. Consider the following
passage from the Critique:
“The postulate for cognizing the actuality of things requires perception, thus sensation of which
one is conscious – not immediate perception of the object itself the existence of which is to be cognized,
but still its connection with some actual perception in accordance with the analogies of experience, which
exhibit all real connection in an experience in general.” (A 225)
The domain of appearances goes beyond the realm of transient sensory episodes, because the
mind itself goes beyond this realm.  As Paton writes:
“The world we know is, however, not an appearance to momentary sense, but an appearance to
sense and thought, or to sense and understanding.  Just because the mind is not mere sense, but is active in
thinking, it is able to transcend the momentary sensation, and to be aware of a world of permanent
110
 See: chapter 1; D, I).
111
 I will, due to length constraints, forgo an analysis of the arguments of the Analogies.
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substances in interaction.  But the world of which it is aware—even in scientific knowledge—is a world
transformed by the necessary conditions and limitations of finite human experience.” (Paton, vol. 1, pp.
63)
Thus, we must, as it were, ‘broaden the spectacles’ so that they not only encompass the objects
of sensory episodes, but the objects from the vantage point of the understanding. This issue may
be further articulated by exploring the possibility of Kant’s appearance/thing in itself dichotomy
having not only a transcendental, but also empirical signification.
b) The Appearance in Itself
i)  Reconsidering the Cinnabar Passage
Kant states that “…without the governance of a certain rule to which the appearances are
already subjected in themselves…no empirical synthesis of reproduction could take place [my
emphasis].” (A 100-01) 112 As we have seen, Collins interprets this as a commitment to what he
terms “objective conditions” – it is a logical truth that the material of representation already
contains the possibility of its representation.  Though this passage concerns the conditions of
categorical representation per se, this logical truth is equally applicable to sensible representation
and representation in general.  In the spirit of “objective conditions”, this passage is not primarily
concerned with the condition of the immediate content of categorical representation, namely
intuition – which is itself a species of representation – rather, it is meant to get at the condition of
the initial affecting being introduced to sensible receptivity, and ultimately to the affecting
reality.
One may read this passage through the lens of the OET interpretation, in which the claim
that “…without the governance of a certain rule to which the appearances are already subjected
in themselves…no empirical synthesis of reproduction could take place [my emphasis].” (A 100-
112
 See passage from the Critique cited on p. 41.
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01) may merely mean that we must consider appearances qua things in themselves to be rule-
governed – i.e., the things in themselves which are ontologically equivalent to appearances must
themselves be rule-governed.  This is consistent with Collins’ “objective conditions”
interpretation.  Thus, interpretation of this passage along the lines of the ontological equivalency
thesis permits us to avoid an apparent tension in Kant’s phrasing “…appearances …subjected in
themselves…”
ii)  The Empirical Object in Itself
In the Opus postumum, Kant attempts to give an account of how his metaphysical
principles bridge empirical principles; he answers the question of how the transition from
metaphysics to theoretical physics is possible.  In this text Kant states that, from the empirical
standpoint of physics, empirical objects are, or, are to be regarded as, things in themselves.
Kant writes:
“We can extract nothing from the sensible representations which form the matter of cognition,
except when [sic] we ourselves have inserted (according to the formal principle of the composition of what
is empirical in the moving forces).  Appearances are here to be regarded as things [Sachen] in themselves.”
(22:319)
“The objects of the senses, regarded metaphysically, are appearances; for physics, however, these
objects are things [Sachen] in themselves, which affect sense, or as the subject affects itself (represent a
priori)…Since the moving forces by which we are affected are themselves, in turn, appearances, with
respect to the system of forces affecting the senses, we can (and may) view them as things in themselves
only in regard to the system.” (22:320)
Now, a complete understanding of how this view is embedded in the overall project of the Opus
postumum is a complicated matter, and I will not attempt to address it here. Nevertheless, these
passages provide material that may be used for clarifying a coherent sense of the locution
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‘appearances in themselves’ which accords with Kant’s commitment to the persistence of
spatiotemporal objects apart from their inclusion within sensory episodes. These considerations
may be articulated independently of explaining the function of the views expressed in these
passages within the overall project of the Opus postumum.
It is obvious that there is a significant difference between stating that empirical objects
are merely to be regarded as things in themselves, and stating that empirical objects are things in
themselves. The former merely implies that from the standpoint of physics we may conceive
empirical objects as things in themselves; it is a statement that does not extend beyond the mere
idea of the things.  The latter, on the other hand, characterizes the things themselves, and not
merely our idea or conception of them.  I will now examine the former claim.
If, from the empirical standpoint, one may merely conceive empirical objects as things in
themselves, then this does not rule out that our conception of them is, despite perhaps being a
necessary conception, unjustified.  Thus, since this claim may consistently be taken as asserting
the possibility of the unjustified ascription of ‘thing in itself’ status to empirical objects, ‘thing in
itself’ may retain its familiar, transcendental definition. Thus, under this view, one is not forced
to seek a new sense of the appearance/thing in itself distinction. The same may not be said of the
claim that empirical objects are, from the standpoint of physics, things in themselves, to which
we now turn.
The view that, from the standpoint of physics, empirical objects, or sense-objects, are
things in themselves, but, from the transcendental standpoint, they are appearances seems absurd.
Let us see if this apparent absurdity can be dissipated. First, perhaps this view is analogous to
the transcendental appearance/thing in itself distinction. In both cases, the same objects are
considered from different standpoints, and have different statuses corresponding to the differing
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standpoints from which they are considered. Within the transcendental distinction, objects may,
without contradiction, be qualified as spatial and temporal appearances from one standpoint, and
non-spatial and temporal things in themselves from another.  Is, then, a similar scenario repeated
within the transcendental/empirical distinction – where the object’s status is relative to the
differing transcendental/empirical standpoints?
While there are similarities between these two positions, these similarities are superficial.
The transcendental status of objects of experience as appearances contradicts any empirical
designation of the same objects of experience as things in themselves in the transcendental sense.
This is due to the fact that, considered as objects of possible experience (i.e., appearances), from
either the transcendental or empirical standpoint they are not outside of their logical relation to
the subject. Things in themselves, in the transcendental sense, are by definition objects outside
of this relation. Empirical objects, then, cannot, as appearances, be things in themselves in the
transcendental sense. Thus, Kant cannot consistently claim that empirical objects qua empirical
objects are things in themselves, unless in this context the definition of ‘things in themselves’
differs from its transcendental sense.
However, the view that the appearance/thing in itself distinction has both a transcendental
and empirical signification is not merely based on a questionable (see: footnote 114)
interpretation of one of Kant’s sparse usages of the terms.  First, the notion ‘appearance’ has a
familiar empirical use as it is, and it is implausible to think that the familiar empirical sense of
appearance has no place in Kant’s writing.  It seems that an empirical analog to the
transcendental appearance/thing in itself distinction has a place within Kant’s theoretic; whether
it is appropriately termed an empirical version of the appearance/thing in itself distinction is
perhaps a contentious point.
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I propose that the appearance/thing in itself distinction may be interpreted as bearing an
empirical signification in Kant’s theoretic; and this sense of the distinction embodies his
commitment regarding the persistence of spatial objects. Accordingly, an ‘appearance’ in the
empirical sense is roughly equivalent to having a perceptual episode of an empirical object.
Something’s being an appearance in the empirical sense, then, depends on its being taken up in
immediate perception.113 An ‘appearance’ in the transcendental sense is something that depends
on a relation to the mind’s mode of cognition, and, to be sure, something which generally
depends on a relation to immediate perception through transcendental and empirical law, but an
object qua ‘appearance’ in the transcendental sense does not depend on being the content of a
sensory episode. Thus, while both senses of appearance indicate a dependency on a relation to
the subject, an appearance in the empirical sense is perception-dependent, whereas an appearance
in the transcendental sense may exist independently of its being perceived. Correlatively, a thing
in itself in the empirical sense is something that does not depend on its being immediately
perceived. This is analogous to the transcendental sense of thing in itself, according to which a
thing in itself does not depend on any relation to the mind’s mode of cognition. The
transcendental and empirical senses of ‘thing in itself’ are analogous in that they both indicate an
object’s independence from the mind.  In the former case, this independence is at the empirical
level – i.e., an empirical object in itself does not depend on its being perceived – whereas in the
latter case, this independence is at the transcendental level – i.e., the object does not depend on a
113 The claim is that in order for something to be perceived, or to be the object of a perceptual state, i.e., to ‘appear’
or be an ‘appearance’ in the empirical sense, it must be perceived.  This is a tautological point.  The objects that
‘appear’ in the empirical sense are not themselves ‘appearances’ in the empirical sense.  Rather, the objects that
‘appear’ in the empirical sense are ‘appearances’ in the transcendental sense – i.e., empirically self-subsisting
spatiotemporal objects – and, per the OET view, by transitivity, things in themselves in the transcendental sense.  It
is the ‘appearing’ of an object in perceptual experience that is perception-dependent, and not the objects that appear.
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relation to the mind’s mode of cognition.114  Thus, a coherent sense of the locution ‘appearance
in itself’ is the conjunction of the transcendental sense of ‘appearance’ with the empirical sense
of ‘thing in itself’.  In other words, an ‘appearance in itself’ is an empirical object – an
‘appearance’ in the transcendental sense – considered apart from being the content of a
perceptual episode. If nothing else, these considerations provide a terminological framework for
questions regarding the persistence of spatial objects in Kant.115
B) Intermediaries
I)  The Immediate Contents of Perception
We have seen that sensible intuition is the mode through which we are immediately
related to objects in our empirical representations of them.  The immediate contents of outer
empirical representation are, given the subjective parameters of outer sense, or sensibility per se,
necessarily in spatial and temporal form. Thus, given the OET interpretation, things in
themselves appear to us in spatial and temporal form, but the character of their appearance is not
wholly intrinsic to them, but is in part, as it were, intrinsic to us – or better, intrinsic to their
relation to us. Thus, TI commits one to the view that we are not perceptually acquainted with the
objects in the character they have in themselves, but rather only in the character they are given
through the lens of our own epistemological regime – in other words, we can know things only
as they appear. This is true even if, per impossible, objects were, in themselves, in an
114
 Interpreting the above passages taken from the Opus postumum in light of the empirical sense of ‘thing in itself’
is unnatural, as there is no need to stipulate a standpoint from which appearances in the transcendental sense are
things in themselves in the empirical sense – from either the metaphysical or empirical standpoint this is true.
Nevertheless, this does not undermine the analysis of the passages – for there are two possibilities regarding Kant’s
employment of the locution ‘thing in itself’ in these passages.  As we have seen, the employment of the traditional
sense of ‘thing in itself’ is appropriate, in which case Kant is taken as asserting that empirical objects may merely be
regarded as things in themselves from the empirical standpoint.  Given the present considerations, this is the right
interpretation.  Such definitional considerations are perhaps irrelevant, except that the empirical analogue of the
appearance/thing in itself distinction is in our language and is connected with naïve realism; and, for our purposes,
the boundary of the language of naïve realism determines the theoretical requirements to be supported.
115
 They do not, however, add anything to the argument that spatial objects persist independently of our perceptual
episodes of them.
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organization similar to the organization in which they appear. We cannot, as it were, pry off the
spectacles. In the ‘coloured spectacles analogy’, the red spectacles are responsible for the colour
the objects appear to be irrespective of whether such objects, apart from the spectacles, really are
red. The same may be said of the subjective forms of space and time – even if things really ‘are
as they appear’, we are nevertheless confined to their appearance.
However, under the OET interpretation, the claim may not be made that the immediate
contents of perception are not things in themselves merely because we are perceptually
acquainted with entities ontologically distinct from them (appearances – and, in the conventional
representationalist/direct realist debate, sense-data).  Rather, the point is more nuanced:  it
cannot be claimed that we are in immediate perceptual contact with things in themselves qua
things in themselves – i.e., as objects which have their ‘formal’ organization in themselves.
At the most general level, TI involves a synthesis:  namely, the combination of the formal
elements of the mind with the material contributions of things in themselves.  Thus, the question
may be raised: ‘Does this type of intermediary process threaten our hopes for direct realism?’
First, we have seen how the OET interpretation of TI preserves the mind-independency of
objects of perception. For, even though we are not perceptually acquainted with things in
themselves qua things in themselves, we are still immediately acquainted with them qua
appearances.  Second, we may assert with confidence that the immediate contents of our outer
empirical representations must be objects in spatiotemporal form. This much is guaranteed by
our subjective constitution. Thus, the immediate contents of perception are mind-independent
objects in mind-dependent spatiotemporal form. However, pause should perhaps, once more, be
given over the phenomenal-idealist reading of the Critique in regard to its commitment to the
epistemological immediacy of sense-data.  The phenomenal-idealist position depends on the
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Cartesian view of sensation, and thus it is vital for any direct realist to give an alternative account
of sensation.
II) Phenomenological Reductionism and Metaphysical vs. Epistemological Intermediaries
To recall, the phenomenal idealist interpretation of the Critique asserts that within Kant’s
metaphysical account of experience is the view that the things that the epistemic, or knowing,
subject is immediately acquainted with in perception are, or are aggregates of, sense-data.  The
phenomenal idealist reading of the Critique claims that the elementary materials out of which
complex spatial representations are composed, are sense-data (or, mental entities). Now, it
matters not if the immediate content of perception belongs to such complex representations – i.e.,
that the epistemological subject is not immediately perceptually acquainted with the elementary
materials themselves – if objects of complex representations are reducible to their elementary
materials, and these materials are mental things, then the objects of complex representation are
likewise mental things.116
However, there is another, more acceptable possibility. I take the Cartesian view of
sensation to mistakenly equate the ontological status of sensations per se with the ontological
status of what is given through them. While it may be the case that sensations are themselves
mental representations, the sensual content with which we are immediately related by sensation
are the real properties of a genuinely outer reality. In other words, it is (contra Descartes) not
sensations per se that the mind apprehends or is related to epistemologically, but the content of
the sensations – sensations are the mode by which we are conscious of objects; they are not the
objects of which we are conscious i.e., sensations are transparent.  Thus, mental representations
116
 If, on the other hand, the objects of complex spatial representation are not reducible to the elementary sense-data
out of which they are composed (e.g., perhaps they are emergent phenomena), it is more difficult to identify them as
bearing the same ontological status as their lowly sensual origins.  However, a more palatable interpretation,
according to which the elementary sensuous materials engendering complex spatial representations are not mental
entities at all, is available.
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may well be the vehicles of our immediate apprehension of outer, physical realities, despite the
fact that theses representations are themselves functions of the mind.117
Now, Kant is committed to the epistemological priority of our perception of outer
spatiotemporal objects; it is necessary that we are immediately acquainted with nothing short of
outer, spatiotemporal realities.  Thus, even though according to Kant the representations through
which we perceive outer spatiotemporal realities are the products of the sensuous materials given
through sensation being worked-up by the form-conferring activities of the mind into complex
representations, the epistemological subject is not perceptually acquainted with these elementary
materials per se.  This may seem to call into question the directness of our relation to
spatiotemporal reality, since these elementary materials play an intermediary role within
perception.
Despite the fact that such elementary materials are metaphysical intermediaries, they are
not epistemological intermediaries.  What this means is that while such elementary materials
logically (or ontologically) precede our perception of spatiotemporal reality, it is not the case that
a perception of such sensory materials precedes our perception or knowledge of this reality – the
117
 No doubt this point needs to be argued.  However, all that is to be established here is a possible direct realist
reading of sensation.  For interest’s sake, consider the following passage in Drake’s, Lovejoy’s, Pratt’s, Rogers’,
Santayana’s,  Sellars’, and Strong’s, Essays in Critical Realism: A Co-operative Study of the Problem of Knowledge:
“The question whether we should or should not make this distinction between what is ‘given’ (the
‘datum’) and the character of the mental existent which is the vehicle of the givenness, is the one question
in our inquiry upon which we have not been able fully to agree…We agree that what is ‘given’ is what is
grasped in knowledge, what is contemplated, the starting-point for discourse; and that what we thus
contemplate (are aware of) is, in the case of perception, something outward, apparently the very physical
object itself.  This outer existent, however, is not literally grasped, as the neo-realists suppose; only its
what, its essence or character, is grasped, as explained in this essay and throughout the volume. The point
of difference is this: Professors Lovejoy, Pratt, and Sellars hold that what is ‘given’ is, in all cases, and in
toto in each case, the character of the mental existent of the moment, although its existence is not given.
The other four of us hold that what is ‘given’ results not merely from this cognitive use of the character of
the mental state of them moment, but also, in part, in most cases, from the attitude of the organism, which
may not be represented in the character of that mental state.  In other words, the function of the mental
state, as well as its actual content, or character, helps to determine what is ‘given’.  If this is so, the datum
as a whole (the total character given) is not the character of any existent; the separate traits that make up its
complex nature may be traits of the mental existent, traits of the object known, or both, or neither.” (pp. 20-
1)
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latter describes an epistemological intermediary.  Rather, the subject has no perceptual
acquaintance with such things at all.  The analogy from physiology Collins offers is quite useful
for understanding this distinction.  Collins writes:
“Consider visual perception.  A human perceiver might communicate a visual experience by
saying, ‘I see a red roof down in the valley.’ At a nontechnical level of understanding, everyone
appreciates that this experience arises out of a very large number of events inside and outside the
perceiving subject.  Light strikes a roof, and myriad rays are reflected to the eyes of the subject.  This
complex physical input is ‘focused’ as it passes through the lenses of the eyes.  A huge number of things
transpire at each retina, and there are further events in vast numbers in the nerves, at the optic chiasm, and
in the brain. We understand that many of these events are simultaneous, while there are also sequences of
events here that we must think of as causally determined.  Events in the optic nerve are consequences of the
particular things that happen at the retinas, which are, in turn, a consequence of outer occurrences.  There is
no question, of course, of experience of these microevents, except in the sense that the perceptual
experience reported, the seeing of the ‘red roof down there,’ is itself constituted of the aggregate of these
occurrences or of some of them.”  (Collins, 150-1)
Thus, in much the same way that there are physiological intermediaries occurring in the
perceiver of which he is unaware, so too are there, according to Kant, metaphysical
intermediaries involved in human perception that are not at the same time epistemic
intermediaries, since they are, likewise, not things of which the epistemological subject is aware.
This may be said of the entire transcendental generation of outer empirical representation in
general – the subject is only epistemologically acquainted with the finished product of the mind’s
transcendental functions.118
118 Remarking on the transcendental “synthetic” processes of the mind outlined in the Transcendental Deduction of
the Critique, Norman Kemp Smith writes:
“The synthetic processes must take place and complete themselves before any consciousness can
exist at all.  And as they thus precondition consciousness, they cannot themselves be known to be
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C)  Concluding Remarks
I realize that the path that has been carved out through the issues I have taken up bears
the footprints of greater minds, and hence is indebted to them for the guidance their scholarship
has provided. For the sake of not committing any injustice to these scholars, however, I should
not strictly claim that the views which I have interpreted from their works are necessarily their
own; they are rather what I gathered from them. It must also be admitted that my analyses are at
times only partial, or have taken for granted the analyses of others; but this is because a full
exegesis of every relevant factor or theoretical connection on which my analyses depend is too
overwhelming or lengthy to be played out here.  Thus, to this extent what is offered is more of a
prospectus rather than a theoretical groundwork.
With all admissions aside, one outcome of the preceding discussion is, I believe, that the
argument for transcendental idealism appears stronger than is typically assumed.  Furthermore,
the plausibility of the project of reading the Critique, transcendental idealism and all, along
direct realist lines has, I believe, only been augmented by this investigation, and if the views of
those, like Arthur Collins, who interpret the Critique in anti-phenomenal idealist terms are
correct, then it seems that the more complete the exegesis is, the more credibility such
interpretation gains.
conscious; and not being known to be conscious, it is not even certain that they may legitimately be
described as mental.  We have, indeed, to conceive them on the analogy of our mental processes, but that
may only be because of the limitation of our knowledge to the data of experience.”  (Smith, 277)
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